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The Five in the bunker: It may be easier to make a deal with Americans than with Soviets

July 9–15, 1991

27

A SOVIET WEEKLY OF WORLD AFFAIRS

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

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

Eduard Shevardnadze. Hopes for CPSU failed

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Cover by Victor Brel

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From our mailbag

■ I often hear complaints that there are no statistics reflecting the events in the Baltics before, during, and after the war. Our newspaper *Atmoda atputai* has published some figures reflecting the dynamics of Latvia's population changes in those years.

In the middle of October 1939 the population of Latvia was about two million people. 70,000 emigrated during the two pre-war years. 35,000 were deported and killed under the Soviet regime in 1940-1941 and 90,000, mostly Jews, met the same fate under the German regime in 1941-1944. 20,000 Letts were called up to join the Red Army and 35,000 were taken to Germany for forced labour. 100,000 fled to the West in 1942-1945 and 40,000 were killed while fighting on the German side. 100,000 were victimized during the Soviet deportations in 1946-1953.

As a result, by 1955 Latvia's population was only 2,010 thousand people – after the massive influx of Russians, Ukrainians and Byelorussians...

Ivars Rozenbergs
Elgava, Latvia

■ There have been rumours in Estonia that the legendary Soviet leader and General Secretary of the CPSU, Leonid Brezhnev, is alive and well elsewhere. B.Aleksandrov, head doctor of Moscow's morgue 36, has told journalists that a dead body resembling Brezhnev in appearance was urgently selectged in his morgue on the eve of the Brezhnev funeral. Aleksandrov was warned to keep silent about the whole thing. During the TV broadcast of the funeral, the morgue doctor identified the heavily made-up body as the one taken from his establishment.

Rumour has it that shortly before his "death" Brezhnev fell in love with a 18 year old girl of radiant beauty. Brezhnev realized that the party leadership would not allow him to divorce his old wife and to marry again. That is why he decided to imitate his own death. The KGB chief and Brezhnev's closest friend, Yury Andropov arranged the whole operation. Shortly after the Brezhnev "death", a man of advanced age, accompanied by his young beautiful lady settled in Samoa ,at a villa guarded by watch-dogs and robust bodyguards.

I can not say whether the story is true, but this is what has been reported by the Estonian newspaper *Esmaspäev*, which also wrote: "If Russia were a democratic nation, Brezhnev could return home and occupy the office of the General Secretary which is going to be vacant before long...

Arvo Sabbo
Tallinn, Estonia

■ I decided to write this letter after *New Times* published ex-

A letter to Father Alexander

■ We are grateful to *New Times* for the article about Father Alexander, a Roman Catholic priest who takes care of leprosy patients. We are grateful to Father Alexander for his offer of help to side people in the USSR.

Our leprosarium has all the necessary equipment and medicines. Our research laboratory of immunochemical therapy for leprosy has developed original medicines which have no analogues in the world. They help us cure the most hopeless cases resistant all other drugs. We have been using our medicine, called diuciphone, for 12 years. Not one of the discharged patients has needed to repeat hospital treatment. That is why in our turn we wish to offer help to patients from the village of St.Lazarus, of whom Father Alexander takes care. We are ready to transfer our medicines free of charge (provided of course, there is a licence from the Ministry of Public Health of the USSR). Perhaps, in the near future we will be able to set up a joint Soviet-Korean venture for producing this medicine, so that we could help leprosy patients all over the world.

We are inviting doctors from South Korea, so that they could see the results of treatment, and in order to share some of our secrets with them (by the way, diuciphone is now being tested as a possible anti-AIDS drug). During our own visit to St.Lazarus Village we could pick some of the gravest patients who cannot be cured by medicines available there, and I am sure that treatment with our drugs will help them.

Having seen the effectiveness of our treatment, Father Alexander could help us, too, by sending us some chemical agents and laboratory equipment which

A Zagorsk leprosarium patient before and after the treatment

are not produced in the USSR (the list of items enclosed).

Once again, let us express our gratitude to Father Alexander for his offer of help.

Nikolay Goloshchapov,
director of the research laboratory of immunochemical therapy of leprosy,
professor, MD

Zagorsk, Moscow Region

Editors' note: We have sent the list of items needed by the Zagorsk laboratory to Father Alexander and are waiting for his answer.

Where are the Letts? Repressed, exiled, killed...

Brezhnev is alive and well on Western Samoa...

"Don't peep into someone else's bed"

cerpts from Marquis de Sade's book and Leonid Ionin's article *The Flowering of de Sade*. I am ready to subscribe to every word in those publications. In fact, a great plurality of various demands and interests exists in the sphere of man's sexual relations. No one can forbid people to indulge in what they really like. This is the elementary truth of any civilized society, respecting the sovereignty of an individual. It is necessary to constantly remind Soviet people that absolutely no one has the right to interfere in people's private lives. It's no one's business whether a person prefers to be spending time with a man, a woman, or a she-goat...

Naturally, it is difficult to speak about such things in this country. In a country which is now slowly parting with totalitarianism there have never been individuals, only citizens and comrades. *New Times* has written about the problems of gays. You must write more on this in order to make gays normal members of society, not pariahs. Gays love, too, why despise and humiliate them? Society must understand, forgive (?) and accept (!) gays.

Denis Losev,
student, Tambov

■ Your reader D.Labareshnykh, a *New Times* subscriber for 35 years, wrote he would burn your magazine without ever looking at it (From our mailbag, No 20/91). I subscribed to *New Times* this year for the first time, and I am very satisfied with the contents. I do not understand one thing, though: why the separatism on each cover by Brel? What about that suit Brel drew on the magazine cover in No18? If he hasn't got anything better to wear, let him call on me, I'll give him my old suit. Why insult our proletarian men?

What was the meaning of Viktor Bogorad's drawing on p. 46, No 15? It contained some obvious sexual connotations. Russian people have always been noted for modesty and I do not think there is a need to re-educate them.

I thought that *New Times* artists understood that glasnost and permissiveness were different things! What right did your chief designer have to caricature well-known and respected people, like Tuleyev, Makashov, Ryzhkov and others? Even caricatures of friends are usually withheld from publication.

And what was that pose of the pop-singer Madonna, whose photo you reprinted from a western paper? The United States can't offer anything better than that, and you are so glad to grab at it...

V.Makarov
Lvov

■ I heard your contributor, Vladimir Voyna, speak over the radio, calling on people to help the needy. I decided to write about myself.

I am a pensioner and I am raising my grand-daughter Nastya, aged three. My daughter has no husband and can't raise the child alone. I have to help her, giving her a little money from my modest pension. As for me, I knew no childhood: my father was killed in the war, at the age of seven I started working as a farm labourer, then I spent 35 years working as a charwoman, and I have also raised two children who are workers now. My daughter is single, and I'm afraid a similar fate awaits my grand-daughter Nastya too.

Please help me meet people who could help Nastya to study English – we can't afford language courses. We need textbooks for children and teaching methods. Perhaps US citizens could help us? We have asked for help before, but in this country there seems to be only one answer for us "There are people who live even worse..." Although I am a pensioner, I have not had a month's rest in five years. I knit things to earn some extra money, but even knitting threads are hard to buy nowadays...

Perhaps, some people would write to us?

Valentina Gribanova
45–94, Rudnaya ul., Talnakh
Krasnoyarsk Territory 663255,
USSR

THE WAY I SEE IT

Drawing by Victor Bogorad

■ *New Times* No.23, 1991 carried my article entitled "'Reforms' are only a watchword," telling about the problems of UNESCO. Unfortunately, my article was so heavily edited that it lost the original balanced approach. I am not questioning the editors' right to edit and shorten contributions, but I would like to state that in the form it was published my article contained exclusively one sided and negative assessments of UNESCO activities. The negative assesments should have been balanced with The mentioning of UNESCO services, in particular services rendered to this country, worse still that a number of critical remarks were left unexplained. That must be why representatives of several countries developed questions as to the official Soviet stance towards UNESCO, especially taking into account the author's position in that organization.

Meanwhile, UNESCO is really living through less happy times – for financial reasons too, but it is taking fruitful efforts to enhance its effectiveness. It is important to support the traditionally strong aspects of UNESCO activities and successful innovations. By the way, the recently ended session of the UNESCO Executive Board has spoken up for further improvement of the organization, making serious decisions in this respect.

Respectfully yours,
Vladimir Gay,
Deputy Secretary-General
the USSR Commission
for UNESCO
Moscow USSR
***Compiled by* Tatiana Chernova**

EXCLUSIVE FOR NEW TIMES

A new party born?

The party which has long been feared by the CPSU Central Committee and which some democrats have long tired of dreaming about is going to emerge from a broad pro-democracy movement

Galina Sidorova, *New Times* analyst, talks to Eduard SHEVARDNADZE, one of the founders of the new party

The call has been made. Arkady Volsky, Nikolai Petrakov, Gavriil Popov, Alexander Rutskoi, Anatoly Sobchak, Ivan Silayev, Stanislav Shatalin, Eduard Shevardnadze and Alexander Yakovlev have called on compatriots to convene in the autumn of 1991 the Constituent Conference to unite democratic forces and parties in various regions and republics of the USSR.

New Times. You are known to have been nursing the idea of setting up a new party for a long time. Why have you and your followers decided to implement this idea now?

Eduard Shevardnadze. I have never made any public statement to this effect before. In my private conversations with colleagues, though, I did say that we had to promote a serious constructive opposition if we wanted to build a democratic state committed to the rule of law. This idea was not supported. Everybody hoped that the CPSU would go on changing and would itself become an embodiment of democracy. This has not happened, however.



Why now? I would like to start by stressing that we are already late. In December, I spoke about the threat of an impending dictatorship. Obviously, at that time we had to raise the question of organizing a broad democratic movement. The threat of a return to totalitarianism remains. People's psychology has been formed for decades. Conservative reactionary forces are fairly well organized. They have organizational structures. They have real force, including armed force. Look at what they did after my resignation: the events in Vilnius were an open armed mutiny against lawfully elected bodies of power. No matter whether the CPSU likes them or not, as a constitutional party it cannot allow the use of force against a constitutional government. Then came the events in Riga and the recent events in Vilnius again. And remember the siege of the Kremlin at the end of March. Had it not been for the principled position of deputies of the parliament of Russia, the events could have developed any number of ways...

NT. When you spoke in December, you said that the democrats "were hiding in the bush." Today it seems that the pro-democracy forces are ready for resolute action...

E.Sh. Everybody has been convinced that the pro-democracy forces are capable of winning public trust. This has been confirmed by the election returns in Moscow and Leningrad. The elections came as a huge success for the democratic forces. But I am ready to presume that reactionary forces may consolidate against this background and the struggle will escalate. I even fear that the democrats may rest on their laurels too early. Our opponents are not dormant. That is why we issued a call to our fellow countrymen to form a Movement for Democratic Reforms.

NT. What is your meaning of a constructive opposition? What kind of a programme are you going to propose?

E.Sh. When I speak about a constructive opposition, I mean a modus operandi rather than a con-



Drawing by Arkady Gursky

crete programme which has yet to be worked out. There is an opposition which tries to torpedo any decisions made by the government and the leader of the country. We are going to support those policies of the government which are reasonable and correct. If we see that there is a better alternative, we will try and win public opinion over to our side and will struggle in parliament.

NT. Still, do you want to form a massive party or a compact group of like-minded people?

E.Sh. Let's suppose we confine ourselves to setting up a party of intellectual elite. In this case we would have no popular support. Especially on this very complicated stage when, in my opinion, people need an organization heeding everybody's interests and appealing to every individual, every person. For us the individual is the most important. Paradoxically, that is why we seek to create a massive movement.

NT. So far, the new organization is a movement, not a party?...

E.Sh. So far, yes. Why is this so? We want to open the doors to as many people as possible. We want to derive support from the masses.

NT. The masses is a rather elastic concept. Whose support are you going to count on?

E.Sh. We do not want to be supported by any particular class or stratum. We invite all our compatriots who share our ideals and principles. Our ideals and principles are as follows: man's spiritual economic, and political freedom, social and economic protection; a parliamentary republic, law and order; radical transformation of economic structures; competition and equal opportunity; making the people of this country the masters of property and the results of their labour; cooperation between nations; preservation of the historical nucleus of our state as a union of free and sovereign peoples; rejection and condemnation of any forms of national extremism, chauvinism, racism; common sense, constructive cooperation of all responsible citizens who oppose chaos and anarchy; equality and interested cooperation in foreign political and foreign economic affairs, peaceful development of the civilization. I repeat, we want to address the individual and we are going to take into account the interests of all social strata.

NT. Are you going to set up your movement's branches at enterprises and in organizations? Or something like voters' clubs?

E.Sh. So far I imagine this as follows: we have an organizing committee or bureau in Moscow and similar organizations in districts, cities, republics – everywhere we get a positive response to our call. What are we going to do next? I believe that it is already time to raise the question of depoliticization and departification. So far the Communist Party continues to preserve its committees at enterprises, state structures, the KGB, and the army. Moreover, there is the monopoly of the CPSU. Ninety percent of people working for these establishments are CPSU members. We will raise the problem of departification. If the idea of departification is supported, then there will be no question of setting up our committees at enterprises, etc. There will be some other structures set up on a residential basis or the district level. But if the CPSU preserves its committees at enterprises and in organizations, we will set up our own committees as well. Why not establish a pro-democratic committee at the Defence Ministry, for instance? I know many officers and generals who would join us. Why not set up our organizations at the KGB or Foreign Ministry?

NT. How are you going to struggle for power?

E.Sh. In the parliamentary way alone. Elections are the most important thing for us. However, no elections can be won without real action and concrete programmes. Actually, even programmes do not help much nowadays. People are tired of concepts, rhetoric, promises. They crave real action. Our authority will be established and affirmed by concrete actions and the struggle for concrete questions. We are a parliamentary party. This does not mean, however, that we do not want to become a massive party. On the contrary, it is only with the broad support of the voters that we will be able to win as many seats as possible.

NT. Indeed, society seems fatigued, also by the unending emergence of new parties and movements. During the transition to a new economic system, to a new lifestyle, people will encounter more troubles. Besides, the CPSU continues to control the levers of power. Aren't you afraid that your party will not have a great following?

E.Sh. We are not going to tire people with rhetoric and new unrealistic programmes. There is more than enough of that stuff. We must bear in mind the element of weariness. If people can see that we are a real force struggling for the interests of all people, they will follow us.

NT. A certain stereotyped image of a political party has formed in Soviet society – a party must be an ideological colossus. What is your attitude towards ideology?

E.Sh. We want to distance ourselves

from ideologies, even if our movement later becomes a political party. The main criterion in defining our attitude towards a new member and the new member's attitude towards us is loyalty to the ideals of democracy. Our members can believe in the socialist idea and work in our party. They can be Christian Democrats and we will still cooperate.

NT. Indeed, yours is going to be a party of a new type.

E.Sh. Yes, like the Bolsheviks used to call their party...

NT. Your sympathizers include members of the Demokraticheskaya Rossiya movement, some Republicans, and even members and ex-members of the CPSU. How are you going to solve the problem of double membership, combining the membership in your party and the CPSU, for instance?

E.Sh. I do not think we should insist that people who want to join us renounce their membership in other parties, the CPSU included. As long as we are a movement...

NT. In other words, you mean that initially your organization will be a heterogeneous political movement and then may turn into a party?

E.Sh. If we become a party, we will have a different approach to the problem of double membership. I am ready to allow that some of the existing parties will be willing to join us while preserving some measure of their autonomy. The same applies to CPSU members who would like to join us but find it too hard to break the ties with the CPSU. We must find some way to include them in our activity in case we become a party.

NT. Your appeal is signed by like-minded people. However, even the most like-minded people have or will have differences. The Communists treat dissidents harshly. What about your movement?

E.Sh. We want to build a movement or a party which has respect for the experience accumulated by political movements in various countries. This is first. Second, the most important thing: the party we are going to establish should be a truly democratic party. If we fail, we will be defeated. We will even encourage factions within the party – the more different opinions we will have the better... Another problem is parliamentary discipline. Naturally, the person representing us in parliament will have to conduct the policy of our party. Otherwise an effective opposition will be impossible.

NT. Communist hard-liners have branded the emergence of your party "the mutiny of has-beens"...

E.Sh. Our appeal contains one sentence addressed to the young. Young people must become the main support, the motive force of the progress towards more democracy. In my opinion, our movement must help young people become politicians in the best and broadest sense of the word. We have strength and we have experience – good and bad, and we want to dedicate ourselves to the mission of making our movement, a movement in which young people will feel at home.

Now, about the has-beens and the currently active. I am aware of this opinion, and I am ready to see the whole propaganda arsenal employed to discredit the initiators and participants of our movement. We have been over that already. We should not fear that. We should not fear the label of a has-been. Fortunately, we are not has-beens. Is Moscow Mayor Gavriil Popov a has-been? He has been a CPSU member, but he is the Mayor now. What about Leningrad Mayor Anatoly Sobchak. And Alexander Rutskoi, the Vice-President elect of Russia, a young man who has seen combat. I know him well and I would say that he is a politician with a great future, a resolute, bold, and clever man. And Russian premier Ivan Silayev can by no means be defined as a has-been...

NT. How are you going to solve the problem of a leader?

E.Sh. We will discuss it in the organizing committee. I do not think there will be much rivalry for leadership. Probably we will have a collective leadership.

NT. By mentioning the organizing committee you mean those who signed the appeal?

E.Sh. There will be other people too, those who have expressed willingness to work in the organizing committee. We will have to consider the financial aspects, the problem of premises on which to work. We will need a newspaper, too...

NT. Where do you think the money will come from?"

E.Sh. The organizing committee is going to discuss this. My personal impression is as follows: there will be no rigid procedure for paying party dues. Perhaps we will consider subscribers to our newspaper members of our movement. Even this may not be necessary. If someone cannot afford paying party dues, we will not insist on it. Other people will be able to make generous contributions.

NT. Do you mean donations?

E.Sh. By all means. We have already called for individual and collective support for our movement. I have discussed it and I know that many collectives and private persons are ready to contribute.

NT. Do you have premises already?

E.Sh. I have not examined the premises yet, but have been told there are some. In case nothing is available, we will be based on the premises of the Foreign Political Association in Moscow's Yelizarov Street.

Photo by Eduard Pesov

In the countdown to the London Summit, our President is facing a choice between two economic development programmes: Yavlinsky's and Pavlov's. Undaunted by the failure of the revolt which it has stirred up in the Supreme Soviet, the Soyuz faction is carrying on its signature campaign launched months ago, to convene a special Congress of People's Deputies which is to call Gorbachev to account and send him packing. In backing this action, secretaries of the Siberian regional Party committees have gone even further – they are calling for a CP Congress of the Russian Federative. Their target is also Gorbachev whose second capacity – that of General Secretary of the CPSU – has long been like a red rag to a bull for both the out die-hard democrats and the out-and-out orthodoxes.

Curiously, the Siberians went into action within one day of Gorbachev's "taming" the parliament. One gets the impression that after the defeat in the Supreme Soviet the Party reserve has been brought into play.

The previous week has been highlighted by the news of perestroika's initiators – the CPSU elite going to set up a democratic party. Their list is topped by Alexander Yakovlev and Eduard Shevardnadze.

Three parties in one

Ferment within the CPSU has markedly intensified. As the General Secretary aptly put it at the latest full session of the Central Committee, he had the feeling that he was addressing at least three or four parties instead of one.

Until as recently as a year ago, the General Secretary had a firm grip on the Party: under Gorbachev's pressure, the Communists forfeited their leading rule enshrined in the Constitution and, at their 28th Congress, embarked upon the road to democracy and a market economy. At the latest full session of the Central Committee, Gorbachev suppressed a row and an intra-Party conflict which were about to break out. Nevertheless, the words about the three parties did escape his lips...

The past month witnessed quite a few remarkable events. To begin with, at the special congress of the People's Deputies of Russia, the Communists for Democracy group broke away from the Communists of Russia parliamentary group. Many in the CPSU were enthusiastic about the emergence of a new group of deputies. Factions of the Communists for Democracy began to form in the Soviets at different levels.

Second, the leaders of the Pilot Congress of Communists have become more aggressive of late – their ideologist, Alexei Sergeyev, ran for the office of Vice-President of the Russian

No time to lose

It looks as if the hot summer of 1991 will change our political landscape

Federation. In all his interviews, during debates and at press conferences he has untiringly aired his own and his followers' orthodox views. Nina Andreyeva's group is carrying on its campaign of propaganda for Stalinism – but without much success..

All of a sudden, rumours began to circulate that some Communists from the CPSU's top echelon, who had initiated perestroika, were getting ready to form a democratic party of their own. Eduard Shevardnadze was the first to divulge these plans when in Vienna on a visit. The Central Control Commission under the CPSU "opened a file" on the ex-Foreign Minister right-away. The news of Shevardnadze having been "called on the carpet" sent waves of indignation (mixed with ridicule) across the nation, so the CCC also summoned representatives from three platforms – Marxist, Democratic, and Sergeyev's – for good measure, and warned them that their action was not quite in keeping with the Party line...

The responses inside the country varied. The hardliners accused those who broke away of treachery, of course. Nikolai Travkin and Arkady Murashov said they contemplated setting up a united democratic party. The republicans (the members of the former Democratic Platform) predicted a merger. Some of the democrats were not happy about the prospect of having the "wise" Communist Party as a competitor. Other democrats, who have chosen anti-communism as their official doctrine, have their doubts about entering into a coalition with former communists...

Alexander Yakovlev in a new role?

One gets the impression that a backstage struggle for Yakovlev is going on. A highbrow intellectual who shuns public attention and rarely claims newspaper space, Alexander Yakovlev has suddenly found himself in the epicenter of Party and political tempests. Incidentally, *Sovietskaya Rossiya* readers may deny the assertion that Yakovlev has receded into the mist. Yakovlev's name is very much in evidence in every issue of that newspaper which has declared a holy war on the senior adviser of the President of the USSR. Its authors persistently mount regular attacks on Yakovlev–about once a week. The purpose of this "jihad" is anybody's guess. The *Sovietskaya Rossiya* writers level sharp criticism against the perestroika ideology but offer no sound alternatives to his ideas. This frenzied anti-Yakovlev campaign conducted by *Sovietskaya Rossiya* amounts to the Party's self-immolation. Indeed, isn't it



Alexander Yakovlev remains a prominent figure in the CPSU. So far...

suicidal of the CPSU to try and squeeze its most gifted and intelligent members out of its ranks?

Alexander Yakovlev commands great respect from, and remains a spiritual leader of, a substantial proportion of the CPSU. The world political elite sets great store by him. Participation of this man in creating a new party gives it a start in political competition for popularity, reliability and good international reputation. Yakovlev and Shevardnadze, the founders of a new party, now differ in social status. The ex-Foreign Minister has resigned from his post and is now a "free-lancer." He has burned his bridges, he is no longer burdened by commitments to Gorbachev, and his CPSU membership only interferes with his present public-spirited foreign policy work.

Alexander Yakovlev keeps his post as the President's chief adviser. By withdrawing from the CPSU, he would show disloyalty to Gorbachev, leave him without support and, as a matter of fact, find himself in opposition to the CPSU and, consequently, to his fellow-fighter.

I remember Yakovlev's television interview after the 28th CPSU Congress at which Yeltsin, Sobchak, and Popov had withdrawn from the Party. As if apologizing, a sad Alexander Yakovlev told a TV reporter: "You see, I joined the Party during the war, in the fighting lines, and I can't forget that. I can't..."

A party for Gorbachev?

Both the democrats, who regard the emancipation of Eastern Europe as a precedent, and the hard-liners, who are rushing things in their drive to delimit the spheres of influence, have long been waiting for the CPSU to crumble. The hard-liners are of the opinion that the Party can depend only on the "ideological purity" of its members for the success of its policy. Quality takes precedence over quantity – may only convinced Marxists-Leninists remain in the Party. In that case, the Party Committees will regain their militancy, and everything will click into place.

Pragmatists are not in a hurry to leave the Party and to take their more than modest following along. They are taking their time about it, although it would be ridiculous to put Gorbachev in a class with Makashov, and Yakovlev with Andreyeva. They realize, of course, that the disintegration of the 16-million-strong Party will shake the society to its very foundations, because for decades the Party has been the only authority and the only master in this society. Besides, it is dangerous to leave unattended several million people who are not accustomed to thinking, but instead are accustomed to doing as they are told.

Some Communists are Polozkov's followers, traditionalists, hard-liners, Marxists-Leninsts a la Andreyeva. Others stand for progressive reforms. But most have simply gotten used to belonging to the one and only Party – unreasoningly and dispassionately. Any clashes in the Party make such communists psychologically ill at ease. In a "critical situation" such people follow the unerring instinct they have acquired over the decades of their Party membership, and choose the safest and, therefore, ideal option – they vote for the General Secretary. Left to the mercy of fate and guided by the same instinct to "follow the leader," they will start looking for another guide. And he is sure to turn up because demand breeds supply.

Will Gorbachev fight to the end for the unity of the existing CPSU? Some say that the new party is being formed with Gorbachev's knowledge and approval. If the present situation in the country persists, we shall probably have national presidential elections in a year's time. Consequently, they reason, Gorbachev is now securing a social base, a political force to lean upon in the election. The CPSU's backing today is not the surest way to vic-

tory, as was demonstrated by the Russian presidential election in which Nikolai Ryzhkov, the CPSU candidate, got one-third the vote won by Yeltsin.

If disintegration is inevitable, let it be controlled, at least – such, for all we can tell, has been the reasoning of the perestroika leaders. This, again, is guesswork. While the nation engaged in speculation about the facts behind the rumours about the new party, Gorbachev chaired the sessions of the group busy drafting the CPSU programme. There are indications that he is well informed about the plans of his closest associates in the Party; nevertheless, he has not despaired of transforming

bothering to explain his actions, and he has left the Supreme Soviet and the Politburo far behind him. At long last, Gorbachev has come to realize that the nation has no time to lose, that he ought to have needed the warnings to that effect given by Yeltsin, Shatalin, and Yavlinsky a year ago, when the Ryzhkov cabinet was working on another impotent economic programme. When the Baltics refused to go back on their declaration of independence they were subjected to an economic blockade. Many of the developments of a year ago further aggravated the crisis the country is now completely in the throes of...

The action taken by the Interior Ministry

Drawing by Gennady Zhivutsky

the CPSU and has used all his influence to keep Alexander Yakovlev in his orbit. As a matter of fact, Gorbachev has gotten a respite: all the initiators of the new party have announced a new democratic movement the first congress of which is to meet this autumn. At the same time, Shevardnadze has informed the public of his decision to withdraw from the CPSU, and Alexander Yakovlev has been afforded room for manoeuvre.

Playing his own game

Victors Alksnis, an advocate of a unitary state, makes no secret of the fact that the Soyuz group wants Gorbachev to step down. The president is held responsible for the disintegration of the Union, for the humiliation of our power, for the troop withdrawal from Eastern Europe, and for selling the country out to capitalists. The same objective is pursued by radical democrats who keep suspecting Gorbachev of secret intentions and perfidy. What about Gorbachev himself? He never looks back, he is urging himself and others on without

troops (OMON) in Vilnius – even though not as violent as the previous ones – have brought from Moscow, at last, the reaction the democrats have long been waiting for. The chief of the Vilnius-based OMON unit, who, we are told, made his own decision to search the local telephone exchange, was summoned to Moscow and held responsible. Although it was rather a symbolic gesture of disapproval which will hardly entail any tough practical action, Gorbachev has never gone even as far as that – neither when the Press House and the Interior Ministry building were stormed in Riga, nor when the custom-houses were set on fire. Against the background of our domestic political situation, the OMON's operation looked like too much of a provocation. Was it supposed to mess up the President's cards before his trip to London? Gorbachev seems dead set on playing the game on his own terms. He is clearing one barrier after another in his way to London. He is not going to take Alksnis' advice because it seems he has other plans.

Marina Shakina

Vladimir Lukin,

Chairman,
International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations Committee,
Supreme Soviet of
the Russian Federation

It is about time we made it clear at last what kind of state ours is. Are we an integrated state consisting of strong sovereign republics or a multitude of states forming a union? Are we a federation or a confederation? There is no evading this question: the rate of our economic progress, our place in the world community, our external and internal security depend on the fate of the Treaty of Union.

The international political situation also urges an early solution to the problem. Despite our purely Soviet "we-are-poor-but-proud" complex, we cannot do without the industrialized world's assistance, although it is up to us, of course, to make the decisive effort. Before the London summit of the Seven, it is necessary to clarify the basic provisions of the Treaty of Union and to decide which economic development programme – Yavlinsky's or Pavlov's – to adopt, otherwise our President's trip to London won't be of much use. This is why the President is in a hurry to solve the problem "here and now."

For some reason, it is taken for granted by the press and by the public that the Treaty of Union will be based on the draft prepared in Novo-Ogarevo. This is not so. In fact, the latest text of the draft is to be thoroughly analyzed and revised in all the parliaments of the constituent republics concerned – and in the process the republics will, hopefully, thrash out an agreement on matters of substance. As of right now, a number of the draft's provisions are unacceptable to certain republics.

The main thing now is to reach an accord on pivotal questions of which there are two, in my opinion: first, the question of who is going to sign the Treaty of Union and, second, the question of power sharing between the Centre and the constituent republics. The former question is of great importance for Russia proper, as it is itself a federation. But this is also an important question for all the republics which, for their part, comprise smaller republics. The leadership of the Russian Federation wants all its republics to be full-fledged entities of both Russia and the Union, but not at the price of Russia's disintegration.

Notably, both the Centre and to a certain extent the leadership of the Russian Federation are responsible for the emergence of this problem. Boris Yeltsin's memorable advice to Russia's former autonomies – "...grab as

London is within easy reach of Novo-Ogarevo

The debates over the Treaty of Union have revealed that the democrats are often lacking in statesmanship, and the statesmen in democratism

much independence as you can swallow" – was not too well considered. Yeltsin has already admitted his mistake himself.

Russia would be much better-advised to sign its own Federative agreement first. However, such an agreement cannot be worked out overnight. Therefore an interim agreement ought to be reached with Russia's republics today. The trouble with us, however, is that our democrats are often lacking in statesmanship, and our statesmen in democratism. If the Council of the republics, into which the present inefficient Council of Nationalities is to be transformed, comprises representatives from 40 republics – entities of the Treaty of Union – will it have room for Russia proper? Where does Russia fit in?

The second key problem still awaiting its solution is the sharing of power between the republics and the Union. The Centre insists on introducing two kinds of power – Union and republican.

We – the working group of the Russian Federation's Supreme Soviet for drafting the Treaty of Union – are going to submit to the Russian parliament the following concept of power sharing: neither the Union nor the Union republics should be vested with the sort of power which can overlap and as a result cause misunderstandings and conflicts between the republics and the Centre. There should exist only exclusive republican powers and joint republican powers, for the exercise of which national government bodies are to be set up. It is these government bodies that will make up the central authority – the embodiment of the Union. In Novo-Ogaryovo, however, the Centre has suggested the following option: "What is mine is mine, and what is yours – we'll discuss that later."

Discussion of the Treaty of Union

As to the other contradictions – those concerning taxation and the President election formula – they can be removed through early compromises.

Some republics come out for two- or three-channel taxation – local, republican, and Union. Russia insists on a different arrangement, whereby the taxes are collected by the republics which hand over a proportion of them to the Union by way of financing specialized development programmes. Such an arrangement exists in the FRG, where the provinces apportion funds to the Centre from their budgets. The result is there for all to see: far from having fallen apart, Germany is prospering. And, after all, the two principles can be combined.

The power structure remains problematic. For instance, how is the President of the USSR to be elected? On a national scale, in parliament, or in the Council of the Federation?

What is to become of the six republics which have decided to stay out of the new Union? Will they exist in a "parallel world" within the framework of the old Union? The problems connected with the accession of new republics to the Union have yet to be dealt with, and so on.

Not a single republic will manage to get out, single-handed, of the mess in which we all have landed. Some still believe that the mere act of secession from the Soviet Union will automatically earn a breakaway republic substantial aid, if not massive dollar injections, from the West. This is a delusion: the West is not interested in the disintegration of the USSR. While in the USA recently as a member of the Yeltsin-led delegation, I took part in the meeting with President Bush, who told us in no uncertain terms that, the Baltics issue aside, the Americans regarded our domestic affairs as no concern of theirs and were only interested in our handling them in such a way as to not impair world stability.

Obviously, history will not end in July. We shall certainly keep improving the Treaty by amending it and adding extra supplements and protocols to it. After all, the US Constitution's formative period lasted for a decade after the declaration of independence, and this had no adverse effect on the quality of that country's democracy.

After the draft of the Treaty of Union is agreed upon, work will begin in earnest to promote horizontal (republic-republic) relations which will replace the rigid centralization of old.

The first leakage

By now all know what went on at the USSR Supreme Soviet's closed meeting. Was this a violation of the law? A provocation? Or concern for the common weal?

First to come into the public domain was what KGB chief Vladimir Kryuchkov said at the USSR Supreme Soviet's closed meeting on June 17. "Who provided the tape is of no importance," Alexander Nevzorov said, as he switched on the recording. Several days later the newspaper *Politika* which the parliamentary Soyuz lobby sponsored, featured summaries of all three statements, not only of the KGB Chairman, but also of the Soviet Defence and Interior Ministers. Subsequently *Sovetskáya Rossiya* and *Literaturnaya Rossia* reprinted the *Politika* material. In this fashion the press gained knowledge of three in camera statements of the chiefs of three ministerial departments. Translated into political terminology this can only be termed as the leakage of confidential information.

Go-getting newswen sought to worm out of Alexander Nevzorov who actually provided him with the tape in question. They wondered whether this was not Col. Alksnis, who featured in the same TV programme and who had brought a tape with him to the Leningrad TV Studios. It was rumoured that the KGB Public Relations Department had itself provided the Leningrad reporter with the said "material." The *Moscow Echo* radio and Russian TV *Vesti* programme confirmed these rumours. Could the KGB be responsible for having leaked at least one of the statements, that of its chief? Was it entitled to do so?

The manner in which parliamentary sessions are held behind closed doors is sufficiently well regulated. Considered a closed meeting is one to which newsmen are barred, that is not broadcast by radio or TV and of which the stenographic records are not available for the public domain. The said procedure was finalized at all meetings dealing the Karabakh enclave problem and some items of the national budget. However, the manner in which decisions are taken as to whether this or that meeting is to be held behind closed doors is still rahter obscure and has not been documentalized. As a rule, the following takes place: the chair announces that a motion has been tabled to hold the meeting behind closed doors and the question is put to the floor. Next a vote is taken, or the matter is settled by approbation or booing. At any case it is for the Supreme Soviet to decide whether the information be confidential or not. Which accordingly implies that only parliament may have the said information relegated or not to the public domain.

During that meeting of June 17 the deputies themselves proposed that it be held in camera. They reasoned that the three chiefs had to be aforded a more confidential atmosphere, so that the information they provide be fuller and more objective. After having heard the three members of the Council of National Security and having queried them, the deputies did not revoke their decision as to the type of meeting held, and the issue of whether the said records could be published was not on the agenda.

Yet the KGB officer told a reporter what its chief had said. What grounds did he have for that? There are only two explanations. It may hypothesized that the KGB public relations officer, having listened to the tape and having decided that it contained no KGB secrets, handed it over of his own accord to Nevzorov, who, according to the KGB Public Relations Office was first to ask the KGB for information about this closed meeting. Were that the case, we will soon learn or already should have learned that the people to blame for the leakage had been penalized. After all, to expose the top chief to such risk is a sin nobody will ever get away with. Yet, one finds it hard to believe this story as it concerns a service with so strict a manner of operation. Rather would one conjecture that the speaker himself sanctioned the leakage. Whatever the case, the KGB has definitely violated the ethics and procedures of the nation's top legislative body.

Incidentally, questions of a less significant nature also arise. In his statement the KGB chief declassified the KGB's 1977 report to the CPSU Central Committee, which had been listed as highly confidential. Why? Had the CPSU Central Committee, which undoubtedly still lists this document as classified matter, agreed to this surprise declassification? Did Kryuchkov notify the Central Committee that he was planning to declassify the intelligence report? Generally, what did the speaker go by when declassifying this document, when the KGB, like all other government bodies, has no precise definition of what is confidential or not and also of what procedures should be applied when de-classifying former classified documents?

As far as Parliament is concerned, it evidently has a stake in knowing how the other two statements by Defence Minister Yazov and Interior Minister Pugo, came into the public domain. The USSR Supreme Soviet has an ethics commission which should evidently initiate a

Drawing by Andrei Biljo

detailed inquiry, as these materials were featured by a newspaper that the Soyuz lobby sponsored.

"We do not conduct any inquiries at all," the commission chairman Anatoly Denisov sought to explain away its silence. "What we do is to analyze manifest violations of ethics by specific deputies, and even then, only if specifically notified. Our status does not allow us to take independent initiative. We cannot initiate an inquiry into the leakage insofar as nobody has asked us to do so and neither ministers no deputies have voiced disgust."

Parliament also has a sub-committee on procedure. Its chairman Kim Yen Un comments:

"Our sub-committee has currently introduced into the new Supreme Soviet regulations the proposal that anyone leaking the materials of a closed session be held legally liable for violation of procedure. However so far neither the Status of the USSR People's Deputy nor any other document specify what responsibility a deputy should bear for leaking such information. Generally speaking, there is no record anywhere that records of closed meetings may not be taken out. In principle that means that a deputy may place in the public domain any information, even a state secret, in as much as he is also under parliamenary immunity. Neither our sub-committee, nor the ethics commission may strip him of his powers for any misdemeanour. We may only give the Procurator's Office the green light to initiate an inquiry into a criminal offence should a deputy be guilty of such an offence, and after such interrogation ends, and the deputy in question be found quilty, agree to have him tried by the USSR Supreme Court."

In a nutshell, the Supreme Soviet has no procedure for tackling such matters. What about international practices? As far as the US Congress is concerned, we can not recall a single case of a closed session of the two chambers, as that is not usually practiced, although it is practiced in committees and commissions.

As for the ethics commission it is invested with much broader powers. During the previous US Congress its ethics commission analyzed in camera eleven cases of unethical conduct as the result of which four congressmen were obliged to resign.

Yet the Supreme Soviet has still not decided what should be done in the case of a leakage of records of a closed meeting. USSR People's Deputy Nikolai Engver, for instance, believes Parliament should initiate an inquiry, to find out how the said statements came to be published.

Anyone may be an agent of influence

At its closed meeting on June 17 the USSR Supreme Soviet introduced into the country's political vocabulary the new term of an "agent of influence." What does this really mean?

According to the KGB's "classic" definition, this is a man working for the secret service of another country, for money, or out of ideological considerations or having been suborned and moreover, occupying a sufficiently high government office able to influence the drafting of the political or economic strategy of the state against which he is working.

From KGB's chief Kryuchkov's report it follows that agents of influence are persons capable "by virtue of personal and business qualities of assuming future office in the apparatus of administration and of discharging tasks formulated by the enemy." During their training and recruitment the CIA "proceeds from the premise that the activities of the various unconnected agents of influence implementing a policy of economic sabotage and distortion of directives, will be coordinated and controlled from one common centre within the framework of the American secret service."

Col.Alksnis put the matter as follows. This does not mean the said person is a CIA agent, a spy who photographs secret documents under his blanket at night. No, an agent of influence is simply a person with whom good-neighbourly relations are established and who is advised or recomended, not for money of course, to behave in this or that way."

As we see, the concept of an "agent of influence" appears to be all-embracing. Hence, proceeding from the third definition any USSR citizen entertaining kind feelings for other nations and countries may be such an "agent." So, instead of the usual definition of an "enemy of the people," one may now colloquially use the term of an "agent of influence."

"I maintain," he said, "that the Supreme Soviet should already ask law enforcement agencies to discover who made the tape available for publication. After that, the issue must be resolved in full conformity with our criminal legislation. After all, Vladimir Kryuchkov was specially asked whether he was giving us confidential information or not. Kryuchkov replied that his entire statement has been prepared specially for the deputies. An inquiry must be initiated as at stake is the matter of an affront to the dignity of not just one or another deputy, but of Parliament generally. By our current inaction, we are simply showing that we are not the kind of people who can uphold the state's legal values. Moreover, such leakages demean the prestige of the country's top legislative body with the deputies made pawns in the hands of people engaged in political gambles."

Not all the deputies are of the same mind as Nikolai Engver. Some sarcastically wonder what he would say if guilty of the leakage were not right-wingers, but left-wingers. Would not they be charged with having disclosed secrets and of having acted in a manner subverting state security? Some added that next time should the left-wing be guilty of a leakage, it would be impossible to present any claims to democrats.

Public interests do not at all fully identify with the specific concerns of the parliamentarians. What the public wants to know is who is guilty of the leakage, how and who needed this operation of the menacing "secret" speech and its further publication, and for what reason?

The KGB chief, we learn, did not report anything new. On the contrary he tried to throw a scare into the parliamentarians by trotting out the shopworn superannuated bogeys about the ubiquitous CIA and Western craftiness. However, as that apparently seemed not enough, the sabre-rattling conservatives, to wit the Soyuz lobby with the backing of its media, in the person of Nevzorov, *Sovetskaya Rossiya* and *Literaturnaya Rossiya,* manifestly overestimating the effect rushed to frighten the nation. They have found themselves in a bad mess.

Generally, one ought to appreciate the people who organized the said leakage, as whatever the intention, objectively they have done a useful thing.

Now we know for certain that the present leadership of our top secret department simply has nothing to say either to the servants of the nation or to the nation itself, neither worthwhile information nor any tangibly competent analysis. Instead, it is manifestly attempting to bring to the political process the methods the secret services employ. Scarcely should our young parliament lend a helping hand by classifying plenary meetings without need. What we have learned may be qualified as blackmail of parliament, or the President and of the public. The best remedy against blackmail and bogey trotting is complete frankness.

Irina Lagunina

On the threshold of democracy

A party defeated at the elections must vacate the political scene. It may become an opposition, not the object of persecution

Poel Karp

Boris Yeltsin won because the people of Russia were thirsty for immediate change. All the various voters who voted for Yeltsin had in common one argument in his favour: Yeltsin opposed the other candidates who advocated milder or tougher versions of the old order.

However, faith in the necessity of a moral and political unity, in the existence of a way out of the crisis that all societal strata would accept, is still alive. The public awareness is a tragic conglomerate of the firm belief that Soviet society is a classless society, a relic of the state ideology, and the non-acceptance of any connection between social and economic relations. Political scientists are again phasing out sociologists. It has become almost indecent to speak about social classes. It is already insufficient to discover novelties in the Soviet social structure – even Djilas who spoke about them forty years ago was not the first to observe them. It is necessary to understand that class struggle must not necessarily be uncomprimized, that parts of the social mechanism can only work together, not individually. Marx at least thought that hired labourers would be able to do without enterpreneurs after the potencies of the latter had been exhausted. His followers in Russia fancied that by making an option for socialism they would be able to make one part of the old structure effective without the other. This is deeply embedded in the public consciousness.

A poor palette

Many people today blame the country's economic plight on Lenin's utopic ideas, Stalin's ferocious temper, Khrushchev's ignorance, Brezhnev's mediocrity, and Gorbachev's pretended indecision; and they continue to equate their class interests with general interests, refusing to pay attention to the objective needs of other social strata which undermines the organic functioning of the social system and creates a need for artificial incentives.

Universal elections are needed only to reach a social consensus without which no society is viable. All social groups must take part in the election race, which will help reveal which of the candidates has more respect for the contradictory interests of various strata. In this respect Yeltsin is superior to all the rest, however, this very objective was not revealed in the course of the elections, because the candidates were different competing individuals, not direct representatives of different strata or classes, or different parties advocating different programmes.

We have been convinced that the party that has been in power for seventy odd years has become an opposition party. However, the CPSU continues to be the ruling party even without Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution which sealed the Communists' monopoly on power. The President, the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, the Prime Minister, the Procurator General, the Chairman of the Supreme Court, and all Union ministers but one are members of the Communist Party. Even those who have withdrawn from the CPSU remain what used to be called "non-Party Bosheviks": they are not free from the stereotypes of the old thinking. Naturally, three or even four parties exist now within the CPSU, as General Secretary Gorbachev correctly observed at a Central Committee plenum. However, these parties have a common General Secretary. Had there been a split at the 19th Party Conference or at the 28th Congress of the CPSU, the political content of the election campaign would have been more clearly defined. Bakatin would not have opposed Yeltsin and the two generals – the simpleton Makashov and the more diplomatic Gromov basking in the light of the Ryzhkov smiles – would not have been rivals.

In Poland the election palette was much richer. There was the incongrous figure of Tyminski, an analogue of the dark-horse candidate Zhirinovsky who came third in Russia's election, and there were also advocates of the old ways. Further simlliarity is less striking. The workers' leader Walesa who openly opposed the old regime of which he had never been a part is not an equivalent to the former regional party boss Boris Yeltsin. The main distinction now is that Russia had no candidate equivalent to Tadeusz Masowiecki who directly represented the pro-democracy segments of society. Masowiecki won a mere 17 percent of the vote and called on the voters to support Walesa, not Tyminski. If Sergei Kovalyov had been nominated in Russia, in a similar situation he would have called on us to support Yeltsin, which we would have done and the result would have been similar to the one in Poland. But in this case the pro-democracy trend would have been more clearly defined and there would have been a guarantee that democratic reforms would not be sacrificed for any other political considerations. At the beginning of this year the position of Gorbachev shifted to the right not under the pressure from "evil" generals, who obeyed orders only to avoid being fired at once, but simply because Gorbachev was not backed by a democratic organization, at least an organization of pro-democratic Communists, which would expel not reformers like Academician Shatalin, but hawkish hard-liners.

On the usefulness of reasonable conservatism

The Soviet and foreign press defines all proponents of change as democrats. Meanwhile, the objective of perestroika was to rescue the crumbling social system. It is naive to think that had not perestroika been started, the good jolly days of the Brezhnev time would have still rolled. The economic chaos continued to escalate since the mid-1970s and even such a lover of firm order as the Leningrad party boss Romanov could not stop it. Under Romanov, Leningrad – the embodiment of the state-industrial complex – was rapidly decaying. Naturally most conservatives – the Soviet definition for all those who support the crumbling social system – believed, like their pre-revolutionary predecessors, that all evil was caused by trouble-makers and dissidents who are easy to suppress. At the same time the reasonable segment of the political leadership, including Gorbachev, Yakovlev, Yeltsin, and their followers, deemed it their duty to save the country from the impending catastrophe

simultaneously saving party functionaries who blindly condemned them.

In non-democratic societies reforms are usually carried out by reasonable conservatives. The Prussian ministers Stein and Hardenberg, who advocated rather conservative views, understood that the war with Napoleon was incompatible with serfdom, although Prussian serfdom was much milder that serfdom in Russia. Their reforms facilitated the rise of Prussia and the unification of Germany ander the aegis of Prussia. Russia needed reforms even more, but they were never carried out and the Crimean War demonstrated that a brave and talented army was doomed to a humiliating defeat if the social structure was a drag on economic progress.

It is a very inspiring fact that Yeltsin, who has changed from a reasonable conservative to a radical liberal, has come to power in Russia. The policy of liberal reforms which are not only declared but also gradually implemented will facilitate the formation of a real political centre with respect to which all conservatives, reasonable, progressive, irresponsible, and reactionary alike, will be on the right-wing flank. However, to be stable such a centre needs the pro-democratic left-wing and its absence may finally prove fatal.

It is time to see that without the complete restoration of the entire political spectrum, without equal opportunities for conservatives, liberals, and democrats to uphold and promote their views within the framework of one and the same set of rules, it is impossible to speak about political prerequisites for extracting the country from the crisis. The Yeltsin election is an important, but tentative step in the right direction.

When Communists support a monarchist

The essence of democracy boils down to the peaceful acquisition of social compromise, and peaceful transition of power when the defeated party becomes the opposition, not the object of persecution. Democracy is not simply the implementation of the will of the majority, it is also the protection of minorities, i.e. protection of nations craving self-determination, small social groups, and private persons from arbitrary treatment; protection from the reduction of various personal and group interests to what is known as common interests under the cover of which those in power tear fatter pieces of the state pie either for themselves or for the shadow economy that guarantees them enormous profits.

Although Zhirinovsky's position was in greater contradiction to the official line of the CPSU than the liberal attitudes of Boris Yeltsin, neither Ryzhkov, nor Bakatin, Makashov and Tuleyev made any effort to clearly define the nature of the Zhirinovsky platform and their attitude to it. Is this really surprising? The enfant terrible of Leningrad TV, reporter Alexander Nevzorov, openly declared himself a monarchist and an anti–Communist, and the Leningrad party boss, Gidaspov, together with Gorbachev's furious critic, Nina Andreyeva, urges people to listen to Nevzorov. The CPSU weekly *Glasnost* bitterly complained that Nevzorov is too young to be nominated for president of Russia and suggested, contrary to all laws, that an exception be made for him. It is only natural that in the time of general confusion people like Zhirinovsky and Nevzorov easily become as popular as the faith healer Kashpirovsky or the astrologist Pavel Globa, but it is remarkable that special admirers of them are Communist hard-liners.

That is where the political spectrum is completed. No distinctions can be observed between the brand-new anti-communism and the deadwood of Stalinist principles. Both anti-communists and hard-liners advocate a unitary state with no independence of peoples, economic freedoms, or human rights. The desire to preserve the old order under the new name, which carries no commitments, may easily be the most dangerous tendency of our days, and this tendency was clearly revealed during the election campaign. In this context, we must value democracy even more as the optimal way for carrying our sound ideas and realizing the moral limit beyond which even the dearest values may not be pursued.

In his recent interview with *Izvestia* Patriarch Alexii II said, referring to the memorable Declaration of Metropolitan Sergius: "Metropolitan Sergius wanted to save the Church by issuing this Declaration. One may say that the Church is to be saved by Jesus Christ not mortal people. This is right. But it is also right that Divine Assistance does not help without the human effort."

Will the human effort save the Church if this effort trespasses on the Lord's Commandments and turns against the Lord, although in the name of His Church?

It is important that both the believers and lay people realize this problem. After all, secular convictions undergo similar transformations, and it is important to analyze social relations and to see the essence of their political interpretations so that Russia's recent joy will not be wasted. Otherwise the unclear election slogans and the euphoria of the Yeltsin victory will overshadow the reality and the people will finally lose control over the developments.



Drawing by Victor Bogorad

LENINGRAD

A bunker for five

Disarmament talks are shrouded in secrecy for the general public and for some high-ranking statesmen as well. The results of such talks are widely known, but how are these results produced? Those who know prefer to keep silent

Nina Petrova

A couple of years ago one Soviet newspaper tried to tell readers about the routine work of Soviet and American negotiators on the talks on reduction of nuclear and space weapons. The least important mistake made by the authors of that article was that the chief US negotiator did not ride in an armour-plated Cadillac, as the newspaper said he did, but drove an off-beat Chevrolet with no armour plating, of course. The article was much fun for the negotiators themselves, who nonetheless preferred to keep silent about how they really worked. Fortunately, they are more talkative in private conversations. This article is an attempt to sum up everything I heard from friends and acquaintances about arms control talks. Although I am absolutely certain of the sincerity of my interlocutors, especially some of them, errors are still possible. However, I can guarantee one thing: there will be no armour-plated Cadillacs in this story.

The news that appalled the parliament

It is incorrect to think that one can negotiate only with foreign partners. Participants in lengthy interdepartmental negotiations are full-fledged participants in the general negotiating process. Every morning in Washington, Moscow, and Geneva, they come to work. In Moscow they head each for his office, very often the shabbiest office around, although it is located in one of those prestigeous and heavily guarded buildings. When abroad, they come together in a special soundproof room which makes no bugging possible, and which is called "the bunker" or "the submarine," depending on the conditions and customs of the embassy. The Americans call such rooms "bubbles." The word "bunker" seems to be the happiest definition, taking into account the specificity of what goes on in those soundproof rooms. The working day begins at nine in the morning and usually drags on until late at night. Negotiations with foreign partners also very often continue well into the night.

The most interesting part in all stories about negotiations is always the one that tells about various ministries and departments coordinating their positions and interests. The actual negotiations with foreign partners fade in comparison with the main negotiations that are conducted in Moscow and abroad between representatives of interested ministries and departments who make up what is known as the interdepartmental working group (or the Group of Five, according to the number of ministries and departments involved in decision making: the State Military-Industrial Commission, the KGB, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Defence Ministry and the CPSU Central Committee). The fact that such a group does exist has repeatedly been acknowledged by representatives of the Foreign Ministry and the Defence Ministry, but only the most attentive readers would remember it. As far as one can tell, members of the USSR Supreme Soviet came to know about the working group in the spring of 1990 when the Foreign Ministry and the General Staff submitted to parliament a report of their negotiating efforts. The fact was made known to the MPs by the then Head of the Treaty and Legal Department of the Soviet General Staff, General Nikolai Chervov (naturally he had an appropriate sanction from his superiors). Among other things, deputies came to know that the sittings of the working group were attended by representatives of two departments of the CPSU Central Committee: the International Department and the Defence Department. This information sent the pro-democratic deputies into a rage, and Chervov resigned amidst much scandal.

Defence Ministers: sharing secrets?

TASS photo

Where to look for Soviet policy-makers

The working group discusses all aspects of all negotiations – major and minor issues alike. In reality, the decisions are made not even by ministries or departments, but by their representatives, because now and then the ministry boards and ministers themselves are too busy to look into small details. That is why the position of the representative of a ministry is perceived as the position of the ministry itself. However, the Group of Five never makes final decisions on fundamental issues. It draws preliminary conclusions, which almost always coincide with the final decisions, and then it

submits them for approval to the Big Group of Five composed of ministers and department heads.

Every negotiating team at talks with foreign partners includes its own group of five – the chief negotiator plus representatives of all interested ministries and departments (without the Central Committee). One has to bear in mind one subtle difference: the concept of a member of the delegation (not to be confused with advisors, experts, secretaries, etc.) is not equal to the position of a member of the mini-group of five. Not all members of the delegation are privileged to participate in the final decision making (some decisions, for example those concerning the legal wording of the position are made at delegation level), but all members of the mini-group of five are members of the negotiating team.

Receiving information from the delegation and embassies in various countries, each ministry and department analyzes the situation and prepares its own variant of the position. Then these positions are coordinated by the Group of Five. What the public refers to as disarmament negotiations are actually the negotiations of the Group of Five, not bargaining with foreign partners. The main clashes of interests and opinions take place within the Group of Five, not between Soviet and foreign negotiators, and it is within that group that the negotiators have to display sophisticated tactics and strategy.

There is also something that is known as the political level. The president (until very recently, the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee) is above all groups of five. The president can interfere in the negotiating process and make the final decision in the rare cases when ministries just cannot agree. The president can demand major initiatives, and he can make a "political decision," for instance, to order that a treaty be finalized by the certain date of a summit meeting. This was the case with the SALT-2 Treaty (1979), INF Treaty (1987) and CFE Treaty (1990). If the president issues the political decision, ministries and delegations are immediately instructed to rush to conclude the negotiations, which would otherwise drag on for an indefinite period of time.

Naturally, there is much confusion in the final stage of the negotiating process and many grotesque situations occur. The case in which a Soviet delegation interpreter rescued the INF Treaty has already become legendary. INF negotiations continued almost without interruption around the clock, and interpreters were changed every two to three hours. On the last night of the negotiations (in the morning the treaty had to be flown to Washington where the two presidents were already waiting for it) the only unresolved issue generated heated debates. The chief Soviet negotiator rose to leave the negotiations (which took place in the building of the US mission). It turned out, however, that the interpreter whose shift had just ended had borrowed the chief negotiator's car to get back to the hotel to sleep. The chief negotiator had to wait for the car for fifteen minutes and the final decision was made during that time.

"We've been talking to American comrades..."

Sometimes the president makes decisions that conflict with the will and intentions of his closest aides. Few people know that last spring Mikhail Gorbachev rescued the START treaty which was hanging by a thread. This is what happened. An article written by J.Smith was published in the United States in which the author claimed that the reductions stipulated by the treaty were insufficient and the United States would be able to seriously outstrip the Soviet Union in armaments on strategic bombers. J.Smith also wrote that the terms of the treaty were much more favourable for the United States than for the Soviet Union. According to reliable sources, the article had been inspired by the then US chief negotiator Richard Burt, who had supplied the author with all the necessary information, perhaps not suspecting what consequences might ensue. Perhaps he hoped to solicit the support of the liberal forces in his attempts to make the American position more stable, or maybe he intended to appease the conservative opponents of the treaty or to achive both these ends at once. The arguments supplied in the article were debatable, but thanks to the efforts of some representatives of the Soviet military-industrial complex, the article acquired an entirely different tone. Everything that had been achieved by that time might have to be cancelled.

Who shapes the Soviet stand at negotiations:

- **State Military-Industrial Commission**
- **KGB**
- **USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs**
- **Defence Ministry**
- **CPSU Central Committee**

Interdepartmental negotiations were quickly frustrated. The Big Five failed to agree as well. The matter was reported to the president. According to people who witnessed the conference at the presidential office, no arguments could influence the treaty's opponents. The matter was resolved when Gorbachev addressed one of the participants in the conference (the readers will never know who the man was, but he was neither Defence Minister Yazov, nor KGB chief Kryuchkov): "Do you disagree with my policy?" The man did not, and the treaty was rescued.

From this point of view special significance must be attached to Head of the Soviet General Staff Mikhail Moiseyev's visit to the United States this May, when the sides discussed the removal of the last differences concerning the CFE treaty. The Americans decided that Moiseyev's visit would be a kind of lithmus paper test: if Moiseyev comes carrying a solution, this will mean that Gorbachev is still capable of making independent decisions. (It was widely known that the military were very dissatisfied with the treaty.) If Moiseyev does not offer a solution, no business will be done with the Soviet president in connection with CFE and START treaties and the problem of rendering huge Western aid to the USSR. Moiseyev did bring a solution and the Soviet-American dialogue was stepped up in all directions.

Each meeting of the Soviet and American foreign ministers is accompanied by a meeting of experts, like any summit meeting. Ministers cannot and do not know all the intricacies of disarmament problems (one foreign minister, whose name I am reluctant to disclose, confided in his Soviet counterpart that he did not really understand what they had just agreed on). That is why each minister has a group of advisors and experts; the Soviet minister is always assisted by the group of five.

It must be noted right away that the process of coordination is no better or smoother in the West. Confidentially, Americans have been known to complain that each change in the US position has to be sanctioned by up to 13 signatures.

Until very recently there has existed one more coordination mechanism which had caused many headaches for those who mapped out arms reductions in Europe. This mechanism was used to work out an integral position of the Warsaw Pact countries, which was not an easy matter. Witnesses say the Romanians were the most conservative and unmanageable ones. It was believed that making a deal with the Americans was easier than reaching a compromise with the Romanians. The Romanians' stubbornness even produced funny situations: once a prominent Soviet

general called his Romanian colleague "Mister," instead of the "Comrade" used among the Warsaw Pact military, and several minutes later said: "We have just been talking to American comrades..."

Secrets all around

The Group of Five convenes in the Moscow bunker (deep inside the General Staff building) practically every day. All people who have ever participated in the bunker conferences have the most unpleasant memories about the physically and morally exhausting discussions.

At the beginning of the talks each department's positions seem to be very streamlined, logical, and well backed up with arguments. Then comes the moment when positions have to be changed or corrected. Naturally, any change must be introduced very carefully, so as not to disturb the integrity of the approach. In reality, though, debates and bargaining proceed amidst mutual accusations of undermining national security and selling the motherland down the river. In this context changes are introduced like mosaics. After the resulting lengthy period of general confusion, a new position is assembled from the pieces that have withstood the argument.

The main decisions are made by the Defence Ministry, or to be more precise, the General Staff, in cooperation with the Foreign Ministry. In any group of five the Defence Ministry is represented by more people than any other ministry or department, because in addition to the official representative, the Defence Ministry also appoints representatives of various departments, services, and chief staffs who act as consultants. The military control the bulk of the information. An equal amount of information may be controlled by the KGB as well; however, at the sittings of the group of five representatives of the KGB whose position largely coincides with the position of the Foreign Ministry prefer to remain silent. The military are also possessed by the mania of secrecy: they understand all too well that information means political power and political influence. At the time when the Politburo was the final authority in all matters, one sitting of the Big Group of Five discussed a major conventional arms reduction initiative. The colonel who provided information about the real state of affairs was reluctant to answer one of the questions, referring to the fact that the material asked for was top secret. Eduard Shevardnadze replied in a benevolent tone: "C'mon, you can tell me, after all, I am a Politburo member..."

Drawing by Victor Bogorad

Representation of the chief staffs is also very relative. In reality, their opinions and recommendations come to the General Staff and get buried there before they are conveyed to other ministries and departments. In general, experienced negotiators say that the people in the military who deal with armaments proper are usually more inclined towards a compromise with the Americans. The reason for this must be that they do not engage in politics and deal with concrete problems in concrete situations. Ironically, representatives of some services of the Soviet Armed Forces have been known to demand concessions to the Americans, because the American position was more favourable for them than the position of their own ministry. These objections, however, were doomed to be rejected by the politicians from the General Staff departments.

The same applies to the defence industry, which is not directly represented in the Group of Five. The defence industries are represented by a Cabinet official who does not often agree with a concrete ministry or a producer, and sometimes disagrees with the military-industrial complex as a whole. Many situations have arisen in which a concrete arms producer was more inclined towards a compromise than the representative of the State Military-Industrial Commission in the Group of Five.

The problem is that the voices of most ministries and departments (or in the case with the Defence Ministry, of most services) are not heard at all. It is clear, though, that all suggestions must be considered. The conservative role of the state apparat is especially visible there. Leaders of the defence industry openly say that they need no special body acting as a mediator between the arms manufacturers and the Cabinet.

Similar sittings are held every day in bunkers abroad. Such sittings are never attended by representatives of chief staffs or of the defence industry (they are not allowed to travel abroad). The military representatives dominate such sittings, while representatives of the Foreign Ministry act more cautiously than ever. It has been said that during the talks on the limitation of space-based and nuclear weapons, all military experts taking part in various working groups (such groups are set up in the framework of each delegation to discuss a concrete major problem or one of the documents) were subordinate to the senior representative of the Defence Ministry. They had to receive his approval before discussing any details with their colleagues from other ministries and departments. Thus, the debates within the regular mini-groups of five were also supplemented with unending arguments with the senior representative of the General Staff, who occupied a separate corner in the bunker. In other words, the delegation was split into two unequal parts: the military on the one side and all the rest on the other. (Depending on the delegation, the military-to-diplomats ratio varies from 3:2 to 4:1.) This situation prevailed until the official notification that there were no departmental delegations, but just one delegation of the Soviet Union. The senior military representative was dismissed (by the way, he is known to be a very nice and amiable person). Today he works for the Russian-American University, like many other servicemen formerly participants in the negotiations.

Remarkably, the five-representative pattern is often broken in the most serious situations. This happened, for instance, during the February 1990 meeting of

foreign ministers in Moscow. On the first day of the negotiations the working group of experts discussed the problem of reduction of armaments on heavy bombers and failed to agree. On the next day, Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev, by that time no longer the Chief of the General Staff but Gorbachev's military advisor, arrived at the negotiations and, accompanied by one silent Foreign Ministry official, locked himself up with the Americans and settled the complicated problem independently. After that the five were very indignant, but finally the agreement remained in the form proposed by Akhromeyev.

On the way to civilized politics

I do not want to produce the impression that the military are to blame for all shortcomings. This impression would be absolutely wrong. Simply, negotiations are conducted by those who have access to information and know technical details. In the past the situation was far worse: the military made decisions and diplomats acted as their mouthpiece. Today this mistake has been corrected. A large group of military diplomats who conduct talks themselves has been formed. However, the art of negotiating has proved too difficult for some of them. It has been said that during a recent meeting of foreign ministers one very important Soviet military figure started the conventional arms reduction negotiations with the Americans by citing a proverb, which he said was widely used in the Soviet Armed Forces: "Shut up if you want to talk to me!"

Indications are that a new stratum of negotiators has appeared between the Foreign Ministry and the General Staff. Opinions have been voiced that representatives of the KGB and the defence industry should also be included on an equal basis.

If the impression produced by this article is that those who control the information are reluctant to share it, this impression is correct. This is one of the most serious weaknesses of the negotiating process. However, the participants in negotiations often confine themselves to departmental interests. Diplomats keep asking for information for themselves, forgetting about the public's right to know. Information must not be the sole privilege of the ministries and departments. Basic data concerning the military budget, the number of armaments, and many other important issues must be available to the general public. Scientists are almost totally denied access to information: they hunt for it independently, through private channels. In other words, the imperative now is openness in military affairs. It used to be much talked about in the past, but has since been forgotten.

Another correct impression is that the work at interdepartmental level is not the happiest possible road to follow. The interdepartmental level of decision-making must not remain the only one. There are a lot of complaints that the lengthy and complicated coordination of interests and preferences of different ministries and departments makes negotiations too long, deforms the initial approaches, and in the final analysis removes the negotiating process from the control of the political leadership of the country. What is needed is an integrated body that would not depend on ministries and departments and that, to an extent, would be above them – something resembling the National Security Council under the US president.

Another imperative is a common vision of national security priorities. The control over the implementation of national security policies must be exercised by the presidential apparat. Today nothing like this common vision can be observed. For example, each department or ministry has its own interpretation of the concept of defence sufficiency. From this arise most of the contradictions. The working-out of a common vision and approach to national security interests is not only the responsibility of the interested ministries and departments. The public, political parties, and think-tanks must also participate in this process. It is widely known that think-tanks play a key role in the West. In this country such think-tanks are isolated from politics. Their representatives are not allowed to attend discussions even on fundamental issues. The Foreign Ministry displayed some compassion when it included a scientist in the Vienna negotiating team in order to promote ties with science, but he was denied access to really serious problems.

Information and openness are needed not for the sake of idle curiosity, but for real participation in the political process. Decisions must be made by the Supreme Soviet and the president, and a special presidential agency must monitor the compliance of political actions with general directives. That way there would be no need for various bureaucratic structures, and policy-making would become really civilized. ■

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Troublous days

June 28 was perhaps one of the worst days in the postwar history of Yugoslavia

A real civil war has begun in Slovenia and Croatia. The Yugoslav People's Army used tanks and planes against the Slovenian separatists. In Croatia the dispute between Croatian and Serb nationalists has erupted into armed clashes. People are being killed and wounded. The Slovenian leader Kucan said that his republic was at war with Yugoslavia. Belgrade newspapers carried articles with laconic headings like epitaphs on a tombstone: "Yugoslavia. 1918–1919."

The situation was brought to a head after Slovenia and Croatia announced

that on June 26 they became independent and sovereign states. The two republics declared their secession from the federation. Without waiting for the outcome of negotiations on the future state system of Yugoslavia, they unilaterally decided to break up their "marriage" with the other republics.

At first, many people were not inclined to take this declaration seriously. They thought that everything would be reduced to fireworks. For even after the proclamation of its sovereignty Slovenia did not have its own currency, passports, and other attributes of statehood. The republic has only a new flag and state emblem. Slovenes can buy vests with the inscription, "I'm absolutely independent." A new subject – Slovenian philosophy – has been included in the programme of the Ljubljana University, though I suspect that this philosophy is known only there. Nevertheless, independence has been proclaimed.

This is how Yugoslavia looked yesterday. How will it look tomorrow? And in general, will it remain?

The separatists were deterred neither by the tough stand of Yugoslav Premier Ante Markovic, who said that the federal government would not allow an arbitrary secession, nor by unequivocal warnings from the European Community and the United States that the newly formed states would not be recognized. The West has stated its position clearly. Yugoslavia can count on badly needed financial aid if its republics remain under one roof or break up by a mutual agreement, without slamming the doors and disturbing their neighbours. Europe does not want anyone to play with fire in its basement.

The warnings did not produce the desired effect, however. To demonstrate that it seriously intends to dissolve its marriage with Yugoslavia, Slovenia has taken the frontier and customs posts under its control. During one night the signs "SFRY" (Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia) were replaced with signs "Republic of Slovenia."

It is difficult to see logic in the decisions of Slovenia and Croatia. The claims by leaders of these republics about their subordinate position cannot be taken seriously. Croatia and Slovenia surpass the other republics economically. Incidentally, they find in them a market for their goods which are not competitive in the West. Thus, there were no economic reasons for secession. References to the recent referendums in which Slovenes and Croats declared independence are not convincing either, because independence is not identical with separation, even more so given that in the last one or two years Yugoslavia has virtually turned into a union of sovereign states in which the independence of each republic was hardly limited by central bodies.

What prompted Slovenia and Croatia to secede from the federation? Many local analysts explain this decision by the attempt of republican leaders to strengthen their own positions and satisfy personal ambitions by taking advantage of the complicated economic and political situation in the country.

The Yugoslav government declared that the actions of the

Six republics, six positions

The sources of the Yugoslav crisis lie in the differing positions of the country's six republics

Slovenia (Slovenes make up 90 percent of the population and Serbs 2.2 percent). According to its president Milan Kucan, "Slovenia is not a constituent part of Yugoslavia."

Croatia (74 percent of the population are Croats and 11.5 percent are Serbs). It comes out as an ally of Slovenia on all major questions of the state system. At the same time, Croatia is more inclined to reach a compromise, because hundreds of thousands of Serbs live on its territory.

Serbia (Serbs comprise 87 percent and Albanians 1.3 percent). Originally, it firmly supported Yugoslavia as a modern federation, but recently it has agreed with the idea of transforming the country into a union of sovereign republics.

Montenegro (Montenegrins constitute 66 percent, Moslems 13 percent, and Serbs 3.2 percent). The republic holds the same position as Serbia and favours the preservation of Yugoslavia.

Bosnia and Herzegovina (Moslems make up 39 percent and Serbs 31 percent of the population). The republic is called "Yugoslavia in miniature." It is vitally interested in the preservation of Yugoslavia. The breakup of the federation would lead to the dismemberment of Bosnia and Herzegovina with attending bloodshed.

Macedonia (68 percent of the population are Macedonians; Albanians make up 19.8 percent and Serbs 2.3 percent). The stand of this republic is influenced by its geographical location between Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Albania, far from the best neighbours in the past. In the event of a breakup of Yugoslavia, territorial disputes may be rekindled. The Macedonian leadership favours the transformation of Yugoslavia into a union of sovereign states. Together with the leader of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Macedonian president has advanced a platform which could become a compromise variant in the settlement of the crisis.

1953. After the death of Stalin, Tito was going to accept some of his methods, but Djilas had doubts...

separatists were unlawful and gave orders to the federal secretariats of defence and of the interior to restore the situation. The armed units raised in Slovenia opened fire on the Yugoslav People's Army units. After that, news reports from Slovenia began to resemble war communiqués. It can be noted in all fairness that neither the army nor the government tried to form national salvation committees on the territory of Slovenia.

The development of events in Yugoslavia has disturbed Europe and the entire civilized world. Representatives of the states – participants in the Helsinki process met in Vienna to consider the situation in Yugoslavia. During 48 hours the European Community twice sent its emissaries to Belgrade – Jacques Poos, President of the EC Council of Ministers (Luxembourg), and Italian and Dutch foreign ministers Gianni De Michelis and Hans van den Broek. German Foreign Minister Genscher also arrived in Belgrade. Neighbouring Austria and Italy have concentrated more troops on their borders with Yugoslavia.

Fortunately, the storm has not yet spilled over into other countries. The EC emissaries were able to persuade the parties to reach an agreement on the basis of a compromise between federal authorities and the governments of the republics. Slovenia and Croatia agreed to declare a three-month moratorium on their decision to withdraw from the federation. The Yugoslav People's Army would return to the barracks and a ceasefire would be established. The antagonistic parties in the Collective Presidency of Yugoslavia would abandon the tactic of confrontation and, in accordance with the Constitution, would elect the Croatian representative Stipe Mesic to the post of President of the Collective Presidency.

In spite of the agreement, however, the firing continues – both in Slovenia, where it may be subsiding, and in Croatia, where ever new sections of the population are being involved in ethnic clashes. Hurrying to follow the example of Slovenia, the Croatian leadership did not take into account the sentiments of hundreds of thousands of Serbs who live in Croatia as a compact group. The Serbs made it clear that they have no intention of living in a breakaway Croatia. The attempts by Croatian authorities to establish by force their rule in the Serb-inhabited areas led to bloody clashes.

Today, when the political ambitions of



Dismantled... *Drawing from the newspaper Tachydromos (Greece)*

leaders have brought the country to the brink of a civil war, when the roar of combat planes and the clatter of tanks drown sober voices, it is almost impossible to predict the course of future events. But nevertheless, some conclusions are clear.

First, the proclamation of sovereignty by Slovenia and Croatia will hardly lead to their early international recognition.

Second, the secession of Slovenia and Croatia will actually put an end to the Yugoslav economic reform. Third, the course of events shows that in our time national problems can no longer be solved by force of arms. Unless a political compromise is reached, Yugoslavia will see a civil war. The country has already experienced a civil war which claimed millions of lives. But our ancestors were apparently right in saying "the only lesson of history consists in the fact that people do not draw lessons from it." I think, however, that few people in Yugoslavia want a repetition of the past or the prospect of becoming a European Lebanon.

By all indications, intensive talks are to be held in the next three months. The European Community is apparently prepared to accept any decision – either the transformation of Yugoslavia into a union of sovereign states or a quiet divorce between republics. Only new conflicts and blood are unacceptable.

There is another, perhaps unexpected aspect of the current events in Yugoslavia. I think these events convincingly refute the widespread thesis that the Soviet Union is to blame for all the troubles in Eastern Europe because the models of development it had imposed on its satellites have led to their collapse. No one has ever imposed any model on Yugoslavia. It was able to choose its path without looking back at the Soviet leadership. The bankruptcy of socialism in Yugoslavia, both in the social and national spheres, is not the result of external influence or the mistakes of leaders. The problem lies in the very system which could serve the people more or less as long as the possibilities for extensive development had not been exhausted, but proved ineffective in the age of the scientific and technological revolution.

Gennady Sysoyev,
our own correspondent
BELGRADE

A LITTLE HISTORY

Tribes of southern Slavs came to the territory of present-day Yugoslavia more than 1,000 years ago. However, the people of that land lived in peace for several decades only. Ethnic conflicts, the struggle against Byzantium and, after its fall, against the Ottoman Empire, the Roman Empire and Venice lasted for several generations of Serbs, Croats, Montenegrins, Slovenes, and Macedonians.

After the defeat of Serbian troops in the Kosovo field on June 28, 1389, the lands of southern Slavs were gradually seized by Turkey and the Hapsburg Empire. It was only in 1796, after several uprisings, that the Kingdom of Montenegro achieved independence. The victory of Russia in its 1877-78 war against Turkey helped Serbia to gain independence.

The shots fired by Gavrilo Princip, a Serb nationalist, who killed the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914, were in effect the first shots of the first world war. Serbia suffered a terrible defeat in this war. Nevertheless, it was not a loser. After the victory of the Entente powers it regained its lands and received former possessions of the Austro-Hungarian empire (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia, Voivodina and Croatia.) On December 1, 1918, in Belgrade, Serbia and the southern Slav provinces of the Austro-Hungarian empire formed the single Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, in which Montenegro was also included. In October 1929 it was renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

However, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia existed only until April 1941, when, after its occupation by German and Italian troops, the Nazis proclaimed the Independent State of Croatia, while the rest of the Yugoslav territory was divided by the invaders into zones and partially given to Hitler's allies – Hungary and Bulgaria.

Yugoslavia arose in its present form after the second world war. However, the building of socialism during four decades could not eliminate national and confessional contradictions in the multinational country or at least work out the standards of joint life acceptable to all peoples within the federation. The communist governments managed to bridle separatist tendencies in the republics. The victory of the opposition forces swept this hindrance away while the prolonged economic crisis sped up the process of disintegration.

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As debtor to debtor...

President Carlos Salinas de Gortari of Mexico heads a nation which is high on the list of the world's heaviest debtors. Nevetheless, he has come to the Soviet Union for the purpose of rendering the "superpower" economic and monetary aid

All things considered, the Mexican leader has shared with the Soviet President his rich experience of dealing with creditors. Incidentally, the world's leading financiers started lending Mexicans money only upon satisfying themselves that the Mexican economy is solvent, and the Mexican political system, stable.

On the eve of his official visit to the USSR President **Carlos Salinas de Gortari** of the United States of Mexico granted an interview to Yuri Kudimov, *New Times'* own correspondent.



New Times. By various estimates, the Mexican economic model is quite efficient. Who of the world's top economists has been of the greatest help to you?

Carlos Salinas de Gortari. I have spent much time studying various economic theories. Before we selected this particular model, we made sure it was right for us, because the fate of 86 million people depended on our experiments.

The Mexican economy used to be largely orthodox, with its rigid state-regulated fiscal system which scared private investors away, with its all-pervasive state control... Centralization went so far as to interfere with the country's economic growth. We were convinced that market mechanisms alone were capable of stimulating Mexico's economic progress.

At the same time, our reform is not a return to an uncontrolled sway of the market forces. We are seeking an economic model which would rule out any market excesses, on the one hand, and overcentralization of the economy, on the other.

NT. More than half a century ago, General Lasaro Cardenas nationalized the property of 17 foreign petroleum companies. This move earned him, at home, the reputation of "the most popular president in Mexico's history." Now, you have taken the line of privatizing big state property. Aren't you personally, and Mexico at large, in for unpleasant surprises?

C.S.G. The policy of nationalization conducted in the thirties was fully in keeping with the international and domestic situation of that epoch. It was believed then that the more property a state possessed, the more chances it had of steering a course of social justice.

Presently it transpired, however, that a property-owning state, with practically all the control levers concentrated in its hands, is capable of neither raising the standard of living, nor curbing inflation... What's more, the principles of social justice are violated much more frequently in such a state than is the case under capitalism. We have come to realize that it's time we started to respond to the nation's requirements. State property was put up for sale, with only the strategic industries like oil extraction and the electric power supply remaining under state control...

It wasn't too long before the resources for carrying out social programmes became available. For instance, using the funds returned by the sale of state property we have managed to expand the water supply network for three million Mexicans, to wire five million peasant homes for electricity, to double the number of heaalth centres in the countryside and in the Indian-populated regions...

Money started coming to Mexico from those who, fearing nationalization, had transferred their capital abroad. Finally, privatized enterprises started selling stock to their blue-and white-collar workers. Their welfare standards improved, the quality and efficiency of their work went up. The rate of inflation dropped from 200 percent in 1987 to 15 percent this year. Over the past few years, the economic growth rate has doubled that of population increase. As a result, the Mexicans' real incomes rose, too.

I make tours of the country every week, and meet with ordinary Mexicans whose position is unenviable so far. None of these poor people calls for increasing state property, however... On the contrary, they want the state to spend less money on subsidising the unprofitable enterprises it still owns. They think that in that case there will be more money availabe for the benefit of small private producers. That is, of ordinary Mexicans.

NT. Mr President, in the Soviet Union and Mexico there are two institutions which neither state is in a hurry to abolish because they help keep a huge proportion of the population under control. I mean the Soviet collective farm and the Mexican peasant commune, the *ejido*. What do you think about the outlook for the *ejido*, and what role does the commune have to play in the process of the country's agrarian development?

C.S.G. In Mexico, there are various forms of property ownership in the countryside. The one you have mentioned is a combination of collective and private property ownership. The problem common to all peasant households is low production efficiency. As it is now, the ejido has no future. We must promote private property ownership.

MEXICO

A romance with an unexpected sequel

From Khrushchev to Gorbachev: Why doesn't Delhi betray Moscow?

Before 1985 we had to be content with other people's political life. Sometimes we even followed with agitation the exotics of political life in other countries: the struggle of parties, elections, and changes of governments. Nowadays we have all that in this country, and most of us give preference to happenings at home.

Therefore, the fact that in the last few weeks our society has focused its attention on the election not behind the Himalaya, but at home, in Russia, will be understood by Indians.

In this country we have never had anything like it before, but for Indian democracy it is nothing to write home about. Last year we gazed with arrogance at the election in the United States, but we have never made fun of Indian elections – not because we regarded them differently, but rather because we had a different attitude towards India.

Even as the USSR was being ostracized by other major powers, the picturesque relations with this influential nation created for the Soviet leadership an illusion that everything was O.K. with our foreign policy. The Indians were no altruists, they simply had their own accounts to settle with Western democracies. After India achieved its independence, the West continued to take a dim view of the gigantic anti-colonial breach in Asia's southern under-belly. And Moscow, having abandoned Stalin's vision of Jawaharlal Nehru as a collaborationist of world imperialism, helped the young nation build basic industry. India has been blessed with a friend, and we have found our place in the world community.

The unprecedented 1955 visit of Nikita Khrushchev to India was the first major foreign policy voyage of a Soviet leader during all the years of the Soviet power. This was a breakthrough, both into the world community and out of self-isolation, after which followed other such events.

From that time, many Soviets began to view India as proof that we had a reliable partner in the outside world after all. This was especially true during the periods of unpopular foreign policy actions on the part of Moscow when many in the world, but not in Delhi, turned their backs on us. One can even talk about an emotional inclination of our people towards Indians.

Caption: Brezhnev is welcomed to India: an illusion that everything was O.K. with Soviet foreign policy.

Since then the Soviet-Indian romance has been impelling us to help each other at difficult times, and sometimes even to give each other absolution. Therefore, our "double standard" in our approach to the contradictory Indian reality, for example to elections, has been dictated not only by geopolitical considerations, but also by a premordial, almost rationally inexplicable favourable disposition.

Now we have our own elections. In the course of the election campaign, one of the contenders for the presidency of Russia repeated the thesis of the advocates of a cautious approach to the market: market economy has brought prosperity to only a dozen countries, and a far greater number of them haven't received any benefits from the market.

To which group of countries does India belong?

India itself does not aspire to identify its market economy with the Swedish, Singaporean, or South Korean models. India has its poles of affluence and poverty. The interests of poor people are, by the way, represented by the well-organized left-wing forces that have an unquestionable influence in representative bodies which is indicative of their far from scanty base.

But between these poles there exist hundreds of millions of people which during recent years were becoming the middle class.

Probably, the main merit of India's market economy lay precisely in its fulfilment of the most promising social mission – the creation of a broad middle class.

Its representatives sit at control panels of Indian-made computers installed in the Indian-built futuristic town-space center Shriharikota near Madras. They ensure the irreproachable functioning of the service infrastructure that makes the life of a middle-income man comfortable and gentle. They work out original technologies putting their country among the ten leading states-patentées. But most importantly – they are first of all subjects of Indian democracy.

So, where does India belong?

By its economic development the country does not belong to the "seven", but it is among the ten industrially most developed countries in the world. And there is also another factor of no less importance – the indisputable moral authority of India and its uncompromising upholding of the priority of universal human values.

Today, to some extent, India has become a hostage of our internal chaos. The plans for trade and economic cooperation are falling through. The new forms of industrial cooperation are taking shape with great difficulty.

But one should not give himself up to pessimism, because the potential of the Moscow-Delhi relations both in economic and especially in political fields is now being enriched by one important factor that did not exist in the past. In the world political lexicon India is known as the "most populated democracy."

According to this pattern one can presuppose that the USSR is going to become the second "most populated democracy" in the world. With India then shifting to the second place with respect to territorial expanses. So, the "most populated democracy" will have to deal with one which is to become the "greatest in extent."

Leonid Zhegalov

After apartheid

Our country has its "visiting card" in South Africa. It is displayed at airports, in government departments and public offices. The "visiting card" represents a red-colour board with an inscription, "terrorist weapons," and full-scale samples of nine types of weapons, from a huge round TM-57 anti-tank land mine to an F-1 hand grenade. The arms were manufactured at Soviet defence-industry plants and travelled a long way down south. This "portable" exhibition of arms, the only Soviet products in popular demand, has the following warning on the top of the board: "Look and save a life." South Africans have gotten used to these boards and, luckily, do not associate them with us. It is a different matter, of course, what we felt on seeing them.



Soviet presence in South Africa has a somewhat explosive character

We did not notice other signs of Soviet presence in the very south of Africa. True, a group of two diplomats has gotten down to work. It is led by Makarov, a high-ranking official of the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

We hope that the time is not far distant when a Soviet trade mission will be opened. Then it will only be necessary to find shrewd merchants. At present, however, the *New Times* correspondent's office is the only Soviet institution which has its address and signboard in South Africa, and we are glad to make this known to our readers. The opening of the bureau of *New Times,* which became an independent magazine half a year ago, was the occasion and reason for our trip to South Africa.

Until recently, South Africa, the only white-ruled country of the Dark Continent, was a black hole, a closed zone to us. We had closed it ourselves in the fight against racism. In the last few years the zone seems to have opened a little. Nevertheless, asked what he knows about the Republic of South Africa, an ordinary Soviet citizen will reply that it is a land of apartheid in which the blacks are courageously fighting for their rights. He will probably mention Soweto, Mandela and the African National Congress. The citizens who read newspapers more carefully might add something about the reforms launched by de Klerk, the "South African Gorbachev." The information known to the Soviet people is correct, but it is not sufficient. No one has any doubt about the great evil of racism. It may be, however, that sanctions against the apartheid regime have created obstructions for our country, too, that our propaganda has played an evil trick on us and has let our politicians down.

When it turned out that our country was in a deep crisis, we began to look at other regions, also torn by wicked antagonisms, without our former arrogance. Incidentally, there were no grounds for arrogance in the past, either. We are trying to understand ourselves and others. The situation would be clearer were it not for one little circumstance. We had too little information. However, "armed" with the most advanced ideology, we thought that we knew everything. That is why during our trip to South Africa we — two *New Times* journalists — decided to learn everything as if from the beginning, to obtain first-hand information. We chose a simple method for this purpose — listening without prejudice to people holding different views, without interrupting them and getting into arguments over trifles.

***New Times* special correspondents Alexander PUMPYANSKY and Nikolai RESHETNYAK talk with a minister who is drawing up a formula for the future. Will it be found, and will the people believe it?**

The South African rulers have been attacked most virulently by Soviet newspapers. In this issue we give the views set forth by members of president de Klerk's cabinet. The president himself was abroad at the time. However, two ministers who hold key posts to a certain extent, answered our questions. The first interview was granted by Gerrit van Viljoen, Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning.

New Times. Changes and reforms are now popular words in our two countries. How would you describe the present stage in the development of South Africa?

Gerrit van Viljoen. We are in the process of emancipating all people in South Africa. Up to now the majority of our population were excluded from the decision-making process. The approach of the Nationalist Party has changed drastically. For almost three decades our party has focused on the separate development of races. The blacks set up their own states (bantustans) and thus create the possibility for their emancipation. But this approach did not work, though the Conservative Party still believes in it. Today we have accepted the idea of one state with all people in it having one citizenship, the right to vote, and the right to be elected to any position in accordance with the Constitution.

N.T. You have defined the change very simply, though it signifies the breakdown of one of the pillars of apartheid. Was the party really able to effect this change so easily?

G.V. A state with a homogeneous population makes, in principle, for a simple form of government. Take Britain, France, Germany, or Italy, for

instance. They have a common culture and language and there is no ethnic friction. We tried to achieve such a condition artificially. However, the material price of the system of separate states-bantustans proved too high and we exhausted ourselves economically. Moreover, it produced great injustice, inequality and discrimination, which can neither be justified nor tolerated in a democratic society.

N.T. How far have you advanced in the implementation of your new, more democratic credo?

G.V. As far as the implementation of this task is concerned, we are going through different phases. The first phase is to create an atmosphere in which negotiation can take place. It was necessary to bring the internal situation back to normal and restore political freedoms. We did that by repealing the ban on public organizations and releasing political prisoners. The organizations, outlawed in the past, no longer have reason to refuse to take part in the negotiations on a new constitution. In this way we have entered the second phase.

We are now holding talks about how the negotiating process must take place. I think it will be necessary to convene a multi-party conference to reach an agreement on how the constitution must be devised. In my opinion, it is the main point for the multi-party conference which must determine the composition and function of the body for devising a new constitution. But the African National Congress says no. It wants first one man – one vote elections to the Constituent Assembly.

Gerrit van Viljoen, 65, Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning. He was Minister of National Education and Administrator-General of Namibia and held other high posts in the previous administration. Viljoen is considered an advocate of de Klerk's reforms. His sphere of activity is the elaboration of constitutional foundations for a future non-racial society in South Africa.

N.T. Is it not a democratic principle?

G.V. We do not agree with the ANC's demand. In this case the majority will win a victory and it means that the majority will decide on the constitution, but a constitution is something of importance not only to the majority, but to the community as a whole. We believe that in the process of negotiating a new constitution special guarantees and special representation for the minorities must be worked out. Negotiations must lead to a broad agreement, not simply the majority against the minority. The reason is that we are not a homogeneous society. We have many different communities, as you also have in Russia. All these communities must feel that the Constitution guarantees them the right to participate in the future government structure.

N.T. For a long time the white minority was indifferent to the problems of the black majority, and now it demands special guarantees for itself. It is not very logical, is it?

G.V. We do not ask anything for the whites. During the previous election in 1985 we stated clearly that a new constitution must make no distinction in terms of colour or race. In other words, it is not a matter of a racial minority enjoying special political rights. However, the Constitution must envisage protection of their cultural and ethnic values.

We have suggested the following model. The parliament will have two chambers – one elected on a simple majority basis, and the other with a more favourable representation of minorities. There must be a balance between the two chambers when they approve laws, not every law, but sensitive laws. The minorities must be sure that laws changing the basic aspects of democracy, the economic order and human rights will not be adopted against their will. Changes of this kind cannot be effected by a simple majority. A balance should be found between the house of the majority and the house of protection of minorities.

N.T. Is this enough for protection of the white population? Do you hope, in particular, to keep its enviable living standards? What are the guarantees for this state to survive on a new basis?

The *New Times* office in South Africa will, undoubtedly, be represented best of all by its charming and hospitable mistress, Zhenya Reshetnyak. This photo is a good occasion to thank once again Paul Coetzee, head of the USSR and Eastern Europe Department in South Africa's Foreign Ministry, and his colleagues for their assistance in opening the first Soviet correspondent's office – assistance which was expressed not only in cutting the ribbon. We send good wishes to journalists and politicians who took part in the "tasting" of glasnost in "our territory" in Pretoria.

G.V. I repeat, we are not going to protect the privileges of the whites or any other social group. But we want to protect and maintain the acceptable standards of political and social life. It is not our desire to become just another African state. Most of them have a very low standard of living. We want to live better.

There is no one single measure or guarantee. We have what Americans call a system of checks and balances. For instance, the Constitution records the special voting rights of the minorities with regard to the fundamental issues of social life. Secondly, there must be a charter of human rights protecting them against the state. The Supreme Court must be independent and have the right to declare invalid any act of the state conflicting with the Constitution or the charter of human rights. It is an important additional guarantee, though I understand that a bad government can act against the Constitution or the charter of human rights. It is important here how control over security forces will be exercised. This delicate issue should be discussed very carefully in the course of

South Africa is a land of bright colours. Cultural contrast attracts or shocks the eyes. Are the traditions and achievements of different communities a source of conflict or the wealth of the multi-racial society? A great deal depends on the answer to this question

● Johannesburg is a super-West in the far south. ● Zulu girls wear festive attire

Photos by authors and John Hone

negotiations. Control over security forces should be reasonable.

If a new government abrogates the new Constitution, or the charter of human rights, or acts against the Supreme Court, then there will be a great conflict. The white minority will not just accept it. Anyone who decides to abrogate the Constitution will have to consider the consequences of the conflict. It is not a minority of 80,000, as it was in Namibia, or of 200,000, as it was in Rhodesia. There are five million whites in South Africa. Moreover, blacks, whites and coloured people begin to share the same political values. So it is not only the whites. It is a coalition of people from different communities. They will stand together – not as Afrikaners or Zulus or others – to defend human rights and the free economic system. Common views and a broader basis for agreement are guarantees for the survival of our state.

N.T. What you are talking about seems to be a dream. People are being killed in African suburbs. The best intentions can be ruined by such a factor as the political culture of the people. Incidentally, the situation is very similar to that in our country. When, in your opinion, can one talk about the formation of a truly common political culture?

G.V. It will be a long and difficult path. We are going into a future when we shall have to build notional unity. We must enlighten the population with regard to the values of democracy. The biggest problem is teaching people to show tolerance towards their opponents. A person should not be killed just because he holds different views. In the present conflict within the

NT REFERENCE

● The Nationalist Party

was founded in 1913.
It has been in power since 1948.
The present leader of the party is President Frederik de Klerk.
In the House of Assembly (parliament) of South Africa it has 93 of the 166 seats.

● The Conservative Party

was founded in 1982 by a group of right-wing leaders of the Nationalist Party who left it because they disagreed with the policy of "constitutional reforms."
The party is led by Andries Treurnicht.
The party holds 39 seats in the House of Assembly.

● The African National Congress

is the oldest political organization of the native population of South Africa.
It enjoys the greatest popularity and support among the Xhosa nationality.
The aim of the Congress is to combat racial discrimination, to achieve a fair distribution of the national wealth, and to gain equality.

In 1960, the ANC and other democratic movements were banned, and their leaders thrown into prison.

The ban was lifted by President Frederik de Klerk last year.

Today the ANC has its headquarters in Johannesburg and local branches in major cities of the country. Oliver Tambo is president and Nelson Mandela vice-president of the ANC.

black community the greatest anxiety is caused by the fact that, competing with each other for political power, the opponents do not share democratic values. One should fight with opponents by counter-arguments, not by violence. It is a big problem on our road to the future. Shall we be able to overcome this hindrance? It depends on the qualities of our leaders. If they exploit the ignorance of the masses and conflicting attitudes among them, it will be difficult to achieve a peaceful solution. The role of the political leaders is of the utmost importance.

N.T. Until now we talked about domestic factors. What is the connection between the developments in this country and the international community, its values, political standards, its economic pressure and sanctions?

G.V. Interaction with the international community is very important. We shall not be able to succeed politically unless there is economic growth. For what purpose do people need political rights? They want to improve their lives, and that is already an economic matter. Even if there are political rights but no government capable of improving the quality of life, a conflict is inevitable. So the international community has an important part to play by lifting sanctions and contributing with investments to the economic growth of South Africa. It could help effect changes in our society within the political process. It must encourage our leaders to take a reasonable democratic stand and persuade them not to abuse the circumstance that the population, especially the lower strata, have not yet realized common political values.

N.T. We have unintentionally returned to the problem which has painful and even tragic consequences in our two countries, the problem of political culture and democratic values.

G.V. There is a simmilarity in this respect, but there are also differences. In the Soviet Union, you had one system – communism. It failed politically and economically. In our country, the situation is somewhat different. Indeed, we excluded blacks from the political and economic system. But in the white community, and since 1983 in the coloured and Indian communities, there was a democratic system, albeit restricted. Our economy has always been oriented on the market. Our aim is to spread this culture, this political and economic experience to the entire population. Your job is more difficult, because you have to learn to apply from scratch the political and economic system based on freedom.

N.T. In our country, some people loudly declare that everything that is taking place, took place, and will take place in our country is our internal affair. Any critical remark from abroad, advice or even an offer of aid on some terms is dismissed as an inadmissible interference in our domestic affairs. Whole departments and institutions look for such proofs, and they naturally find them in abundance. How are things in your country in this respect? Are your people also ready to fight hopelessly against the whole world?

G.V. Yes, there is a strong resistance in South Africa to interference from the outside world in our internal affairs. But we have come to realize that we are not isolated, that we are part of the world and so there is a limit to denying the world the right to show concern about developments in South Africa. Unless we have a system which leads to economic growth and a political system based on freedom, unless we have law and order and stability, we shall not gain understanding and support on the part of the outside world. Even though we do not like interference, we need support for our economy. We cannot let the outside world tell us what to do. We ourselves must make decisions which are right for South Africa. But we must assure the international community that we shall meet its reasonable requirements in the fields of law and order, stability and free political system.

N.T. Nevertheless, why did you decide to carry out changes? Was it the result of pressure, sanctions on the part of the international community?

G.V. Pressure had some influence. But the basic reason lies elsewhere. The policy we pursued over the last few decades has failed. This has been increasingly proved by the course of events. We ourselves wanted to effect changes. At first, we granted equal political rights to Asians and coloureds. Then Pieter Willem Botha appointed a government committee to work out how the blacks could be brought into the system. So the decisions made by de Klerk today have grown out of the experience of the last few decades.

N.T. Reforms have been started. How fast will you be able to implement them?

G.V. We have experience which we should not forget. Presidents Vorster and Botha lost their energy for reforming. Vorster started reforms, but everything was stopped in the last three years of his presidency because he lost energy. The same happened to Botha in his last two and a half years in office. Thus we lost six to seven years, which resulted in the delay of the reform process.

PRETORIA–MOSCOW

■

Why wear a hidjab

The role of religion in the Islamic Republic of Iran

The Teheran Conference of Nov. 28 – Dec. 1, 1943 was a landmark in history. Much has been written about it, with truth and fantasy combined. I walked about the historical premises of the Soviet legation where that Conference was held, stopping now at the spot where the table of the Soviet delegation stood, now at the door through which Roosevelt was wheeled in, now at some mirror. "These are new mirrors," I was told, "the old ones were smashed by the rioters who broke into the Soviet Embassy in Teheran after Soviet troops were sent to Afghanistan." Thus the invasion of Afghanistan was followed by the invasion of the Soviet Embassy in Teheran. The embassy building was gravely damaged. Some premises were reduced to ashes. The local authorities responded slowly to the demands of indignant diplomats, giving the rioters a chance to do whatever they liked. No one really cares about paying for those damages today either, despite the regular official reminders of Soviet diplomats.

All signs of that unhappy incident were wiped out a long time ago. The embassy building looks fine in its spacious 12-hectare park, perhaps the largest territory of all the Soviet legations abroad. Incidentally, this plot of land in the centre of Teheran, which would be very expensive today, became Russian property thanks to Col.Kapitonov of a Cossack brigade, a skilled gambler who won it at cards from Prince Atabek at the beginning of the century.The Soviet Union has inherited the splendid area with luxuriant trees. Parrots have chosen these trees for building nests, and the ambassador himself does not permit anyone to scare them away. So, the birds feel safe here, their triumphant cries informing the world of their happy state.

Continued. For the beginning see issue No.26.

In June the Embassy's gardens of paradise welcomed many visitors from the USSR, who had been invited to attend the second anniversary of the death of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The large delegation included 150 people, mainly Shiites, from Azerbaijan alone. One of the Soviet visitors, a Sunnite, who offered prayers side by side with those Shiites, noted with fright: "Some of them are so bellicose. Just like local Muslims they chant: 'Death to America! Death to Russia!'"

The Islamic Republic of Iran has special relations with Azerbaijan. No wonder. The 58,000,000-strong population of Iran includes 15,000,000 to 20,000,000 Azerbaijani. I was told that Ayatollah Sayed Ali Khamenei, the religious leader of the nation, is also an Azerbaijani. Teheran officials closely watch developments in Azerbaijan, not at all approving of the revival of Azerbaijanian nationalism. Meanwhile, economic contacts between the two republics are being encouraged in every way. Plans have been made to build pipelines and power lines between the main part of Azerbaijan and the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic using not the lands of Armenia, which lie between them, but the territory of Iran. A major economic agreement was concluded during the visit of the Azerbaijan Prime Minister to Teheran last June. For instance, there are plans to use the Iranian territory for laying the Baku–Nakhichevan Railway. The opening of consulates of Iran in Union Republics of the USSR and vice versa has also been under discussion.

New diplomats in Iran will have to get accustomed to local ways: the rather reckless attitude of pedestrians towards motor vehicles, alcohol being banned, and the black dress of most of the people in the street.

All women dress in black: a big kerchief covering the head and leaving only the face visible (one end of the kerchief is often held between the teeth), a long, loose cloak, wide trousers, shoes, and stockings. I asked a young Iranian law student why all women wore black. "They like it," he said. "They want to be up to the mark in everybody's eyes," he added as a weighty argument.

One of the mullahs who had come to Iran with the Soviet delegation said to me: "It is very good that women go about town in a veil or a hidjab, as it is called here. They beautify themselves at home to gladden the eyes of their husbands. But Soviet women put on their best dress to go out and are slovenly at home." Another visiting mullah noted: "Perhaps they wear black fearing the guardians of the Islamic Revolution, who have got too much power..."

One can see women in hidjabs everywhere: in the street, at a tennis court, or any other place. Very young girls in this attire swing or skate-board in public gardens even in the broiling sun. I have seen, though, that young people are not too particular about their dress, sometimes wear-

ing their long black cloak with jeans and sneakers, or with a light-coloured kerchief. Some ladies wear kerchiefs so as to show their beautiful hair. I was surprised to learn that many Teheran ladies are affable and easily talk with Europeans. I do not know why, but the question they usually asked me was, "Are you from Germany?" And I was pleased to see that they did not dash aside when I answered them, jokingly: "Shaitan Kuchk," that is Little Satan – the Soviet Union.

When I ponder on an obvious discrepancy between "the form" and "the content," I compare the situation with that in North Korea. With its tough regime, the total measures of security, and a leader at the head of the nation, that Asian country has much in common with Iran. But even in Pyongyang, to say nothing of the provinces, far from answering your questions and talking with you in the street, people are sure to hurry away. Both countries suffer from a strong "besieged fortress syndrome," so to speak. In the People's Democratic Republic of Korea it is kept up artificially. No one has ever attacked that country. Iran, on the other hand, with such a sinister-looking neighbour as the Iraq of Saddam Hussein, has more reason for such a mentality. So, why are many hidjab-clad Iranian ladies so uninhibited?

There may be several reasons for this. While national and historical circumstances are of no small importance, the crux of the matter is different, to my mind. A command economy which developed according to a strict plan for almost half a century, plus all other "boons" of the command system could not help but influence the behaviour of people. Iran did not have that. Moreover, today it is vigorously encouraging the development of its market economy.

Some of my readers might say that a polite smile of a Teheran lady, perhaps in a cheerful mood, has inspired me to a sort of lecture on political economy. Those readers may not be very far from the truth. But it can also be assumed that hidjab-clad Iranian ladies want to emphasise that one should not treat too seriously their ostentatiously upholding the canons of Islam. By the way, the Internuncio of the Vatican in Teheran notes that Iran is the least religious country of all he has seen. Apparently, the attributes of Islam should not be regarded as the yardstick of people's religiousness.

The Griboyedov monument on the Soviet Embassy's grounds in Teheran, where Alexander Griboyedov was assassinated

Another argument in support of this point of view can be found in recent Iranian history. I believe many people, particularly those of middle age today, bear in their minds an imprint of the tempestuous years of the Shah's "white revolution," although they may not be fully aware of it. The Islamic leaders have been doing their utmost to eradicate it, the repressive system has been fighting against it. But, thanks to this imprint, people are uninhibited and sociable. The years when Iran was heading from backwardness to the heights of industrialization, when agrarian reforms were carried out, and when the system of education was markedly extended did not pass in vain. True, the sinister SAVAK was at large then, social stratification was going on, and the people were suffering under the heavy burden of arms purchases. For all that, it was a secular life under temporal power. And the repercussions are still being felt.

Since they came to power 12 years ago, the religious leaders have been doing their best to spread Mohammedanism and its ideology to all walks of life. When the ideology of Islam became predominant, Iranian women donned a hidjab, "of their own accord," naturally. I was told that under the Shah a woman in a hidjab was seldom seen in the capital or in any other large city, only in the provinces.

The religious leaders of the nation proclaimed fundamentalism because the people had been utterly disappointed by the ideas of communism, and because the Western mode of life was at variance with the Iranian traditions. Thus it was necessary to look for Iran's own way of development. The motto "Neither the East, nor the West" is very popular with the Iranian leaders. (Incidentally, at the initial stage of the revolution Imam Khomeini proclaimed "Neither the West, nor the East." The current motto has been used since the early eighties.) According to Iranian religious leaders, Islam is both a way to man's moral self-perfection and a means of social reorganization. Of course, there is enough extremism in fundamentalist aspirations. It should be noted, however, that Iranian traditions and history have been aptly used. For the Iranian regime of our day Islamization is a special form of self-defence, a way of shielding itself from any undesirable influence. Outwardly it manifests itself by a return to the religious attributes of days gone by. The most important factor, however, is people's attitudes towards these attributes.

Emancipated. Aren't they lovely?

Vladimir Zhitomirsky,
our special correspondent
TEHERAN–MOSCOW

Photos by author

LAW-GOVERNED STATE

Foreign travellers' new headache

The Soviet government boosts customs tariffs

Starting July 1, 1991, the Customs Committee of the USSR will introduce "Rates of customs tariffs on personal items sent to the Soviet Union by international postage routes or taken into the Soviet Union by private citizens." *New Times'* **Oleg Vishnyakov** interviews heads of the Soviet customs service: **Leonid Lozbenko,** first deputy chairman of the Customs Committee, **Valery Draganov,** deputy chairman of the Customs Committee, **Valery Kruglikov,** head of the economic department of the Committee and **Vladimir Shcheglov,** head of the inspection section of the customs control department of the Committee.

N.T. What necessitated the introduction of new customs tariffs?

L.L. The Soviet Union has received the status of an observer at the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). One of the necessary prerequisites of the Soviet Union's membership in the GATT is customs statistics reflecting the export and import of Soviet goods plus effective customs control. So far we do not have either.



TASS Photo

The first step in this direction was the introduction of export and import tariffs. This was a hard financial blow on many commercial organizations which used to derive hyper profits from selling computers, video equipment, and other electronic appliances. The enterprising people guessed that the way out was to transfer their operations from the trade turnover to passenger traffic. In other words, they did not conclude any foreign trade deals, but simply carried from abroad as many as, for example, one hundred computers, 600 electronic wristwatches and 80 pairs of shoes and payed minimal customs tariffs.

New customs tariffs equal the rates of the import tax. In other words, all persons, juridical and physical, who import goods to the USSR will now operate under the same conditions.

N.T. How will the new tariffs affect ordinary travellers?

V.S. In fact, new customs tariffs will in no way affect ordinary people. Soviet citizens coming home from tourist trips or business trips will have the right to bring in goods with no tariffs if these goods:

1) are intended for personal use by the buyers or members of their families and have been purchased with the money exchanged for foreign currency in the Soviet Union before the trip (as confirmed by the customs declaration) or earned in the form of salary, bonus, emoluments or any other kind of payments, while the person was abroad (an appropriate certificate is required in this case, too);

2) have been presented as gifts given to the person in question.

In addition, the price of the presents brought to the Soviet Union may not exceed 1,000 rubles in retail, not commercial, prices. I would like to add that the Cabinet is now considering a draft law stipulating an increase to 2,000 rubles of the price of presents which can be brought to the USSR with no tariff.

N.T. Obviously, it is not going to be easy to determine the state retail price of goods which have long since disappeared from state-run shops and can be found now only in commercial shops...

V.D. Our statistics show that only one out of every ten passengers travelling on private trips pays customs tariffs. I would like to assure our citizens once again: the newly adopted tariffs are intended only for commercial structures.

N.T. The new rules stipulate that a tariff can be levied on each item according to either the minimal or the maximal rate. For example, the tariff for an excessive bottle of brandy may vary between 40 and 60 roubles. Who is going to make the decision which tariff to apply? On what will this depend?

V.K. The decision on which tariff to apply will be made by the customs officer. The maximal tariff rate is applied when the quantity of goods considerably exceeds the limits of personal use.

L.L. All developed countries have detailed lists of goods and customs tariffs applied to these goods. We are also preparing such lists, which will be published. For example, the customs tariff for bringing in a pet amounts to 15 percent of the pet's price. In the future any businessman wishing to import bullterrier pups or Persian kittens, for instance, will know exactly how much the tariff will be and whether the import will be worth the effort.

N.T. The rules do not provide a clear definition of the quantity or amount of goods necessary for personal use or utilization. The rules do not make it clear exactly how many items exceed the norm for personal use. How will the customs officer determine which shirt is the superfluous one and receives a tariff of 15 rubles? The whole authority will be vested in the customs officer, whose regular pay is about 300 rubles, naturally the low pay may make the officer vulnerable to temptation...

V.D. We do not think it will be reasonable to introduce rigid limits – for instance, five pairs of socks, two pairs of trousers, one tape-recorder, etc... We have been over this already. I would like to stress that if one's foreign currency is legally earned, one will be permitted to bring in as many various goods as one wishes without any tariffs. If the norms are exceeded, the customs officers will treat each case individually. As for possible arbitrary actions on the part of customs officers, any decisions made by them can be appealed by higher authorities or in a court of law.

L.L. You are asking how to determine the upper limits of what can be brought in without tariffs. Here you are: if you bring in 20 pairs of socks it's OK, but if you bring in 200 pairs, its already a commercial quantity and you have to pay...

N.T. Appealing the customs officers' decisions sounds nice, but who is going to spend that much time and nerve in courtrooms? Only if really big money is involved... Is it still permitted to take foreign currency into the country?

Byuing a car twice...

Customs tariffs for cars being brought in to the USSR:
engine volume (cubic cms) 1,000, up to 1,500, over 1,500 –
tariff SUR 10,000, 20,000, 30,000 resp.

If the owner can prove that the car was bought on legally earned foreign currency (say, by presenting his salary certificate and purchasing documents on the car), he pays **20 percent** of the car's price.

If the car was a gift, the owner has to pay up to **50 percent** of its price.

A car brought in to the USSR in this way may not be sold within the space of two years, otherwise the owner will have to pay a tariff of **100 percent** of the car's price.

Soviet-made cars purchased abroad are not tariffed, but the two-year selling limitation term also applies to them.

Tariffs on computers, depending on the class of hardware:
SUR 7,500 (min) – **11, 000** (max);
12,800 (min) – **17,600** (max).

Video camera rates from **1,500** (min) to **10,000** (max) and VCRs from **1,000** (min) to **5,000** (max).



Drawing by Victor Bogorad

V.S. According to the Customs Rules for Persons Residing in the USSR, foreign currency, documents payable in foreign currency, jewels, and precious metals are admitted into the Soviet Union in any form and state without any tariffs or limitations. We do not even demand a confirmation that the currency was obtained by lawful means. The only requirement is that the sum be specified in the customs declaration.

N.T. Don't you think that the introduction of new customs tariffs on computers and other hardware the country needs so much will result in a considerable reduction of the deliveries of such products to the USSR?

V.K. According to our forecasts, the introduction of new customs tariffs will facilitate the filling of the domestic market and correct price formation. Besides, today 80 percent of the computer hardware exported to the USSR is made up of the so-called "yellow" computers, manifactured in Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, which only litter the domestic computer market.

N.T. I do not think computers made in Taiwan or South Korea are so inferior to Japanese, American, or West European-made hardware. Most Western computers contain "yellow" parts and assemblies... The problem is different. Almost all people who have at least once travelled abroad complain of the lengthy and humiliating customs control procedures. Will the procedure change now that customs officers have been given the right to make conclusions about each soviet traveller's luggage?

L.L. Naturally, the whole procedure of customs control will have to be radically changed. We have already worked out special programmes which take into account the experience of developed nations. For example, in all international airports of Europe luggage is checked in the absence of the passengers. When Moscow's international airport, Sheremetyevo-2, was built, this type of control was not enviseged. In the future we are going to build a new airport complex, but the situation is not going to change very soon...

N.T. What is your attitude towards the setting up of Customs Departments in the Baltics?

L.L. Definitely negative.

N.T. The signing of the new Union Treaty is only a matter of time now. May some republics be tempted to pursue independent customs policies?

V.S. On July 1 the new Customs Code of the USSR will come take effect. It has been worked out taking into account the new political and economic requirements. The Code will be effective in all republics which endorse the Treaty. The Code is based on three basic principles: one territory, uniform legislation, and one customs authority – leave absolute power to the Customs Committee of the USSR...

* * *

The new rates of customs tariffs actually introduced by the Cabinet, not by the Customs Committee which in this case acts only as the executive arm of the government, were necessary. The vacuum had to be filled somehow. However, the way it was done will only add to the chaos now reigning at the customs checkpoints. The ostensibly democratic refusal to define the clear-cut norms of "personal use" provides much room for corruption.

There are no clear definitions of what things and now many of them can be brought in on "lawfully earned currency." What does this mean? According to the new rules, if someone has laundered his money, no limitations exist for him... It is absolutely impossible to understand which authority will certify the legality of the money earned abroad...

The Ryzhkov government boosted the tariffs on personal computers, putting them out of the reach of ordinary people – personal computers are too expensive to buy today. Ryzhkov did not understand that the country needed computers badly. He wanted to replenish the treasury at the expense of computer deals. Pavlov is acting along similar lines, refusing to be content with ten percent of the sales tax the treasury now gets from each sold computer, xerox, or fax. In the spirit of the times, however, Pavlov provides a patriotic justification: the unwanted computers are bad, "yellow" ones.

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

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A PRISON RIOT

A penitentiary as seen through the eyes of a political prisoner

The series of true stories we are launching in this issue is written by former political prisoners who served their time in penitentiaries among felons. The stories span almost a forty-year period of the history of our "corrective labour system," from the late forties to the mid-eighties. They contain a full and thorough description of prison life in lurid detail...

Valery Abramkin, head of the Penitentiary System Humanization Centre

Valentina Chesnokova, sociologist, a research associate of the Centre

Vladimir Cuprianov, Photo

Most of the prisoners or ex-prisoners we polled conveyed their first impressions of a penitentiary camp or a pre-trial confinement ward for those under investigation, with words like "madhouse," "nightmare," "chaos," "the beyond"... What a novice comes up against there, prison mores above all contrasts sharply with his previous life experience. Take, for instance, the "caste of the untouchables," or "cocks," and the numerous taboos and savage rites related to it. Many of these primeval practices originated in our so-called corrective institutions some 20 to 30 years ago.

Gradually, as one grows into the life of that strange world, one comes to

comprehend its logic, its inner workings, and its immutable, though unwritten, laws. Although a mere onlooker may find them strange and harsh, these laws are certainly fair for a prisoner who has learned to live with them, and the unofficial order based on them guarantees those who observe these "laws" a considerable margin of security and understanding with his cell-mates, and their moral and real support, which means much in a situation where the jailers are all out to suppress your personality.

In any prison or prison camp, official regulations, enforced by the authorities and based on formal state and departmental laws and instructions, clash with unofficial rules based on "prison law" and tradition. The clash between the two codes of conduct is readily understandable: what kind of accord can there be between a jailer and a prisoner? The degree of confrontation between the two is high enough, however, to suggest more fundamental reasons for mutual dislike. What the opponents say about one another obviously contains an emotional reaction to an enemy (here are two typical examples: "A good cop is a dead cop," on the one hand; "a jail bird is a worse enemy than an American GI," on the other). As described by A. Kuznetsov, a prison riot and its suppression look more like a battle between two hostile armies than a settlement of a conflict in a corrective institution. The war that has been on in the GULAG Archipelago for the past thirty years is reminiscent not so much of combat action by civilized armies as of religious strife with all its "guerrilla" concomitants.

The official reformatory doctrine regards both the "laws" and the informal rules as pathological phenomena which interfere with the process of reforming criminals and which therefore are subject to eradication. The reader will, perhaps, be surprised by the fact that the sympathies of political prisoners, who can hardly be suspected of criminal leanings, often lie with just such "pathological" practices. Camp au-

thorities fight these practices and suppress them, as do the chaotic forces from within, but they keep arising from the ashes, Phoenix-like, and re-establish themselves spontaneously.

The explanation probably lies in the fact that this is a cultural rather than a social phenomenon. It is easy to see, for instance, that the prisoners' sub-culture, which took shape in the early 1960s, is fairly close to traditional culture and, on the contrary, the order imposed on the prison camp inmates by the administration totally ignores the elements of traditional culture. By way of illustration, prisoners are offered all sorts of benefits, privileges, and even the possibility of an early release on the condition that they do something utterly immoral (i.e., commit treachery or be at the jailers' beck and call).

The confrontation between formal and informal codes of prisoners' conduct has the character of cultural incompatibility, mutual rejection, which we see not only behind barbed wire but which manifests itself in many of the conflicts by which our society is beset.

Alexei Kuznetsov, b. 1948, an economist, was condemned in 1983 for keeping and distributing "anti-Soviet literature" (*GULAG Archipelago* by Solzhenitsyn, *Animal Farm* by Orwell) and "pornography" (Nabokov's *Lolita),* and sentenced to two years in jail. At present he lives in Moscow.

...I served time in Kabardino-Balkaria, in a "common" (as distinct from "hard") corrective labour camp, in which felons ruled the roost. The administration ("cops") only saw to it that prisoners did not run away. What was going on in the barracks did not concern them in the least. Within the prisoner community there was a rigid hierarchical system headed by the "top tough" (camp overseer) and his "gang" of five to seven men, something like the Politburo under the General Secretary. In turn, the "gang" gave instructions to the "boys," the toughs in command of the "teams" into which all the inmates were divided. Such was the power structure: the overseer – the gang – the boys. Then came the "boors" – i.e., ordinary prisoners, the toilers. And further down the hierarchy there were "turbojets," kind of servants, who brought food, washed socks, etc...

> If the camp superintendent had not bought a Volga car within a year of assuming the post, he is a rare exception to the rule

At the bottom of the pecking order there were "cocks," the most despised caste of the prisoners who, however, had a hierarchy of their own. The "top cock" had a harem of neat boys who bossed about a bunch of degenerates the likes of which I've not seen anywhere else. The latter swept the camp grounds, cleaned the toilets and did all the dirty work. Anyone who happened to pass by such a human wreck deemed it his duty to kick him, so these "untouchables" tried to keep out of the way. Such was the hierarchy – a very rigid one.

The laws governing that world, and the notions current there are very difficult for a normal human being to understand. For instance, you are not supposed to pick anything up from the ground, you will disgrace yourself if you do. If you drop anything, it is as good as lost, you don't pick it up because the ground is swept by the "cocks" who are untouchable.

As to the jailers, I have no praise for them at all. Some are pathological sadists who hate the prisoners' guts. But most are "businessmen" who will do anything for the prisoners who are prepared to pay for their services. The prison camp is a gold mine for the administration. If the "boss" – the camp superintendent – has not bought a Volga car within a year of assuming the post, he is a rare exception to the rule. All of the "cops" cash in on the prisoners... The latter get all the tea, vodka, drugs, food and clothes they want – at a price! The entire administration is corrupt through and through.

I spent only five months in that camp in Kabardino-Balkaria. A riot broke out there after a guard shot a prisoner in the "corridor" between the residential and work zones.

Almost all the "joy stuff" – vodka, drugs, "grass," tea – arrived in the work zone first and then proceeded to the residential zone. The administration tried to stem that flow, a constant struggle went on; holes were made in the work zone fence every night, the administration had the "cocks" patch up the holes every morning, and so on and so forth. Finally, the administration warned that those caught making holes in the fence would be shot at. The prisoners' reaction was peculiar: "You've got to warn us in writing, give us a

paper to sign, and until we sign it this is all hot air!" That's how they reasoned, and continued shuttling across the "corridor." Then a soldier, who was probably dying for an extra leave of absence, shot at a prisoner and wounded him.

Caucasians are a hot-tempered lot. Passions began to run high towards evening, and after dusk the prisoners showered the watchtower and the guard office with stones. All the administration fled from there. The prisoners smashed the outside lamps, put up a barricade, set the work zone on fire, pulled the strong boxes out of the office, smashed them open with crowbars and threw their contents into the fire.

Soldiers were brought in in force. They started shooting, but the rioters kept away from the line of fire and so only one of them was slightly injured. The following morning, a bull-faced colonel arrived on the scene – I think he was the chief of staff of the Rostov riot police division, and said that he could give the prisoners 15 minutes to take the barricade apart and line up, otherwise he threatened to march troops into the camp. Well, the prisoners knew what would happen if he carried out his threat – those were the punitive troops of the Interior Ministry, complete with helmets, shields and bulletproof jackets.

The "top toughs" put their heads together, conferred in the Kabardinian language and decided to surrender. The prisoners dismantled the barricade and lined up on the inspection ground. The inspectors put up a table in front of the line for the camp chief, the prosecutor of the region, the Prosecutor of Kabardino-Balkaria and the chief of staff of the Interior Ministry troops to sit at. They started asking the prisoners what their grievances were and what they had rioted for. Some of the prisoners went forward to state their complaints. A young man of 18 or so, he showed bruises on his body and said that such-and-such an ensign had beaten him up. The investigators jotted his name down and said they'd look into that. Then an elderly prisoner walked over to the table and produced a handful of bullets. "Why did you open fire on us?" he asked. "We are Soviet people, we were not trying to run away, but they shot at us like we were wild animals."

The escort blocked the exit with his foot, and then we heard curses and dull thumps

They asked him for his name, and he told them. "Hand over those bullets," they said. "No, I won't." "All right, we'll look into that."

A cranky prisoner stepped out of the line and said: "I'm new here, look what kind of outfit they gave me." Sure enough, it looked a couple of sizes too small for him. "Your name? We'll look into that."

After they had put down all the grievances, they told the men to get back to work. Half of the prisoners, myself included, went to the work zone. An hour or so later, we were told to stop working and to line up again. We got together near the entrance gate. The gate opened, letting in a lot of cops, most of them total strangers to us. They surrounded us. Abidov, the local warder, one of the worst of them, scurried back and forth along our column, picking men out at random. I heard him call out ny name: "Kuznetsov! Where's Kuznetsov?" "I'm here," I responded, unsuspectingly. "Come over here!"

I must say that during the riot almost all the prisoners had armed themselves with anything they could get hold of – sticks, rods pulled out of iron beds, knives, sharpened files... It was hard to avoid that, if they caught you empty-handed, they'd shout: "What are you waiting for? Get yourself a stick, fast, the soldiers are coming. You want **me** to defend you, or what?" Nevertheless, I was perhaps the only prisoner in that camp who did not pick up either a stick, a stone or a rod. I realized what being involved in the riot would mean for me, considering the charges I had been convicted on. As a matter of fact, no one actually compelled me to arm myself – either out of consideration for my position, or simply because they rather liked me... So I hadn't taken part in that riot at all, but the warder picked me out nevertheless, along with the toughs and the "bosses..."

They rounded up fifty or so men and pushed the others back. We were thoroughly searched, squeezed into Black Marias, and taken to prison. After the vans had come to a halt, an escort opened the door and said: "Jump out one by one." As soon as the first of us jumped out, the escort blocked the exit with his foot, and then we heard curses and dull thumps. They started beating the first man right then and there. After a while, we heard the command: "On the double, you bastard!" and the man broke into a run. The soldier removed his foot from the doorway: "Next." We recoiled from the door, but you

can't hide in a van. The men jumped out, one by one, and got beaten up. Then my turn came, and out I went.

I found myself facing a wall and a sturdy character in a light-coloured summer coat (he turned out to be the chief warder of that prison), with several officers and ensigns standing next to him. The moment I jumped out, three or four men charged me. Dodging the blows as best I could, I moved sideways, with my back to the van, waiting for the order to run. They battered me a little, then shouted: "On the double!" Punch-drunk, I saw a courtyard, a gate and a solid wall...Where was I to run? I spotted a wicket with some steps in front of it, and headed straight in that direction as the next one was jumping out of the Black Maria after me. I ran for those steps – and straight into a huge hulk of a man who hit me in the "kisser," hard... For a moment, I kind of hung in midair... I still remember the bird's eye view I got of some cops standing alongside a flight of stairs; I was amazed to see two young women among them.

While I was falling down that curved flight of stairs which led to a basement, each of those cops made sure he hit me. From the stairs, I cartwheeled into a corridor, where two athletic men in T-shirts and a cop brandishing a big stick at a cell door waited for me. On my way along the corridor, the athletes hit and kicked me karate-fashion with characteristic shrill cries. I fell, jumped to my feet, finally made it to the cell door, the cop with the big stick opened it for me, I rushed in, and then he banged me on the head from behind. That was a well-rehearsed technique for treating "rebels."

Half-defeated by blows and all that noise (the beatings were accompanied by a terrible racket throughout), I finally found myself in a prison cell jam-packed with forty or so men. We could hear the cell next door filling up, too. Ferocious-looking warders looked into our cell a few times to count heads. Then the tumult subsided. Night fell on the prison. All the sounds died down, but the quiet did not last long. After a while, the door was thrown open, and a voice barked out the order: "Ten men out, on the double!" There was a footfall. Ten men ran down the corridor. Another spell of silence followed, horrible silence. Then all hell broke loose: heart-rending shouts shattered the quiet. I must say that when hurt, Kabardinians shriek in a horrible blood-curdling way, their anguished cries sound like lamentations over the dead. Those cries scared us stiff, because we did not know what we were in for. Those were shrieks of unbearable agony, and they went on and on. After a pause there were more footfalls in the corridor, commands of "Hands on your heads!" "On the double, you swine!" curses... More shrieks, more silence, then more shrieks... Then we heard a cop shout: "Hey, why have you left one of your mates behind, you bastards? Don't you see he can't walk? Come on, give him a hand. Calling yourselves people, eh? You're beasts, that's what you are!" "Look who's calling us beasts," I commented.

Then it was our cell's turn: we, too, were broken up into groups of ten. I was to be in one of them... I tried to be neither the first nor the last out of the Black Maria and out of the cell. We were driven along the corridor at a run, and then pushed into the "search room." Before I could look around, we were locked in a tiny cubicle of a room where we could only stand pressed tightly together like sardines in a tin. I could hear the cops talking among themselves. After a while the door was opened a crack, and a voice ordered three of the men out. Then we heard the voice ordering the three to undress, then came thumps and shrieks... The next threesome included myself, the two others ran ahead, I tried to follow them but a cop stopped me...

I can still see him in my mind's eye. He had his shirt sleeves rolled up, a truncheon in his hands, beads of sweat on his forehead, and his pale yellow hair was tousled... And his eyes... I could see at once that he was in a frenzied state, that he simply did not understand what he was doing, that he might very well beat up his own mother if told to... I stood with my face to the wall, and they started beating me from behind. The rubber truncheon does not break your skin and causes no loss of blood, it is meant for doing you internal damage. As they worked on me, I naturally cried out in pain, again and again, adding my voice to the chorus of anguished cries.

They beat me for a while, until the officer told them to stop. I heard him say "O.K., he's had enough," but they apparently didn't hear, and carried on. Then he repeated, "Stop it, men, you'll kill'm, look how skinny he is." After he had explained to them that I was skinny, the one on my left-hand side shouted into my ear: "Turn around, you! Turn around, damn it..." What followed was a long string of obscenities. I was too dazed to understand why he wanted me to turn around, but I had to fulfil his order, so I complied, taking my time about it. As it turned out, he got a special thrill out of kicking naked men in the groin. I barely dodged the blow, he missed, and his boot tip bruised my hip. Then they hit me again a couple of times, and yelled, "Pick up your rags, scum, and get the hell out of here." I snatched up my clothes, my head swimming, and dove back into the cubicle.

Inside, my mates, beaten black and blue, were struggling into their pants and robes. A new group arrived, and we were told to put our hands on our heads and to run into the corridor. We did as we were told, and lined up in the corridor, with our faces to the wall. I made the mistake of resting my elbows against the wall instead of spreading them out. I saw the prisoner on my left and the one on my right – the boy who had complained about the ensign having beaten him up – flattening themselves against that wall. I felt that I didn't "conform," but before I could do anything about it, I heard steps behind me, and then felt someone breathing down my neck... I never found out what hit me, but the blow was well aimed, as it got me in the kidney and sent me crashing down. Before that, I had seen a prisoner being kicked unconcsious on the floor and, fearing the same treatment, I worked my way up to the upright position and flattened myself against that wall, gasping for breath...

Order restored, an officer ordered us to line up in a double file. We did that, with our hands clasped behind the backs of our heads. Then the officer explained the situation to us as follows: "You are all under investigation, a commission from Moscow is here. If any of you swine squeaks, he'll be right back here. Got it? All right, let's see now how fast you can run." We showed him...

Later it transpired that of the one hundred men picked out for exemplary punishment, only twenty were found guilty of active involvement in the riot and had a few years added to their prison terms. The rest were pronounced innocent. Fifty men went back to their camp, and others were scattered over other "zones of confinement." For some, the incident had horrible consequences. The "ringleaders" included Artur Orlov, one of the "toughs" I had respect for. When the administration tried to negotiate with the rioters, he spoke on the latter's behalf, standing on the barricade with a crowd of prisoners in their black pea-jackets behind him... After the "negotiations," Artur was "given the works," which left him more dead than alive. Alone in his prison cell, he gouged out both his eyes...

After that riot, and the investigation that followed, I was deported to Perm Region in the Urals, to a so-called "red" high-security prison camp.

It was in that camp that I served the remainder of my time...

See the next issue for a story about prison castes and gays.

FROM THE XXth CENTURY POLITICAL THOUGHT

Introduced by *New Times* analyst **Rostislav Zolotaryov**

In the 1960s, Polish sociology and philosophy lived through their Renaissance, but one should say that the tradition of social thought in Poland never had been broken despite the years of war and oppression and ideological dominance of the Communist regime. Indeed, the Marxist rulers never had any monopoly in the spiritual life of the nation.

There were latent flows of thought that fed the tradition of Polish philosophy and social and political thinking in those years and prevented it from vanishing.

It was also the source in which the Marxian social science drew abundantly. It helped it to sustain and made it less orthodox and more flexible. The socialist tradition in Poland has been rather strong, appearing often in different disguises and not only that of hard-core ideology represented by its Stalinist version. Left-oriented scholars knew how to turn Marx against that set of ideological dogmas that used to bear his name. But there were few apologists of this dogmatic learning. Most of Marxist scholars, if they were not to become Party or State functionaries, preached absolutely bona fide and their piety to Marx was sincere. And when the times came and some leaders of the New Left in the West brought the bearded prophet back in his temple, the interest in Marxian thought grew in Poland as well. Those were the times when Praxis school blossomed in Yugoslavia, and so did the tradition of old pundits of the Frankfurter school. There was an absolutely genuine interest in Marxian thought among the majority of social scientists. The Polish scholars contributed to a search for answers to the formidable question, "What did Marx really said?" – as Ernest Fischer put it. Many were very busy with problems of alienation, class and group consciousness. They tried to bridge the gap between the poor results of the socialist order and magnificence of socialist vision. Revival of Marxism was in one respect a linguistic process and in the other a reflection of the "crisis" of the capitalist West suffered in the 1960s.

In those times it seemed quite reasonable that both the West and the East faced the same problems. One answer was the theory of convergence. Another one was the quest for "a third road" and some ideas of the New Left and those of Young Neomarxist Turks seemed proper to build a new theoretical paradigm. But this theory should not be caught by ideological stereotypes.

One interesting attempt to investigate the nature of ideology is represented by an essay by Jerzy Szacki published in *The Polish Sociological Bulletin* in 1966.

Ideology and "false consciousness"

Jerzy Szacki

Although "false consciousness" is usually regarded as a peculiarly Marxian idea, it has been given relatively little attention in Marxist literature. Suffice it to say that no thorough, systematic account of what Marx and Engels wrote on the subject has as yet appeared, though there have been writers in plenty who questioned the very usefulness of the concept. I would argue that within the framework of historical materialism the problem of "false consciousness" is of a fundamental importance. It provides the basis for the most general and perhaps most vital methodological principle laid down by Marx and so concisely embodied in the oft-quoted passus from *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy:* "The distinction should always be made between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, aesthetic or philosophical – in short, ideological, forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out." Now I cannot help feeling that this (and similar) statements by Marx and Engels have never served as a basis for a systematic reconstruction and continuation of their conception of "ideological forms," but have tended to be used as a point of departure for what are at bottom sterile speculations on whether all ideology is necessarily a deformation of reality.

This calls for some clarification: (1) this paper is based on a – probably controversial – assumption that the "false consciousness" theory of Marx and Engels can be discussed as a homogeneous and, basically, unchanging whole. But this does not mean that I am taking a definite stand in the controversy about the relationship between the "early" and the "mature" Marxism; (2) I sometimes put "ideology" and "ideological forms" between inverted commas to emphasize that they are used in the Marxian sense. – **J. Sz.).**

What is worse, many investigators have really gone no further than concluding that according to Marx, no true knowledge of reality had ever been supplied by any of the earlier theories and that it was only in his own doctrine that such a knowledge was at last revealed. On this reading, Marx's criticism of "false consciousness" amounts to little more than a modified version of the Enlightenment attack on "prejudice" maintaining that mankind had erred, but was now beginning to follow reason. The term "false consciousness" is sometimes taken to be synonymous with epistemological falsehood and is bestowed (like the word "ideology" in its Marxian uses) with a clearly pejorative connotation. Though Marx himself offered grounds for this approach, another interpretation seems possible: the problem of "false consciousness" would then belong to the sphere of s o c i o l o g y rather than epistemology, and the relevant concepts would be regarded as of a purely descriptive nature. It is arguable that only such an interpretation makes the notion of "false conscious-

ness" worth preserving, though not as a basis for appraising the cognitive value of social opinions – since it has as a rule been used to designate broader philosophical outlooks which are made up of something more than theoretical propositions open to such evaluations. The purpose of this article is an interpretation along these lines, or rather the presentation of a certain sequence of questions to be asked.

"The reform of consciousness," Marx wrote to Ruge "is only a question of the world observing its own activity; the object is to make it stop dreaming about itself and explain to it its own activity/.../ Our motto, therefore, should be: reform of consciousness not by dogma but through an analysis of mystical consciousness which is obscure to itself /.../ It will then become obvious that the world has long dreamed of things it yet has to realize in order really to possess them. It will be obvious that what is involved is not to draw a demarcation line between the past and the future, but to fulfil the ideas of the past. Finally, it will become obvious that mankind is not beginning some new work but is consciously completing its old work." These words seem the best commentary to the critical analyses of Marx and Engels, particularly – but not only – concerning German philosophy and utopian socialism. These analyses were not designed to demonstrate the "falsehood" or "unreason" of some theory – which would have been enough for the Enlightenment rationalist and for many a modern Marxist. The idea behind them was a conviction summed up in an aphorism in the same letter: "Reason has always been there, although not always in a reasonable form." Here attention should be drawn to at least three questions. Firstly, Marx and Engels insisted that this more or less reasonable "form" depends not so much on the intellectual efficiency of the thinker as on his social situation. "If in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside down as in a *camera obscura,* this phenomenon arises from their historical life-process." They often speak of the "indispensability," "necessity," "need" of thinking, in just this distorted way, and of a "wrong consciousness," but they also say that state and society are "themselves a world upside down." In short, they are not satisfied with demonstrating that certain views are incompatible with reality; they are also (and perhaps primarily) interested in the sources and nature of this incompatibility. Separation of "truth" and "falsehood" is by no means the end of the matter. Secondly, when Marx and Engels describe a set of opinions as "false consciousness," this does not mean that they consider them as totally "false" in the colloquial or epistemological sense of the word. A case in point is their attitude to Hegelianism which they persistently exposed as "ideology" but valued highly for its contribution to knowledge. Nor did this necessitate a division of Hegel's philosophy into unrelated domains of "ideology" and "science;" on the contrary, this progress in knowledge was the work of an "ideologist" who had "unwittingly" reached certain apt conclusions and rendered some "unconscious" services. The same applies to their attitude to utopian socialism, the bourgeois theories of political economy or the novels of the legitimist Balzac. Thus it can be concluded that the notion of "false consciousness" is employed not so much because the views it incorporates are false, but because – in the words of Julian Hochfeld – these views are outside "the control of their own proponents." What is "false" is the thinker's self-knowledge, not necessarily his entire knowledge about reality. These are different matters. The altter can be verified *ad hoc* by usual scientific procedures; the former is only "verified" in social struggle. And, thirdly, according to Marx and Engels, "false consciousness" sometimes plays a vital – and by no means negative – historical role. This, of course, is best exemplified by their analysis of the ideology of the 1789 revolution, where they insist, for instance, that all mass "interests," asserting themselves in history, when they first burst on the scene, go, in their "idea" or "image," far beyond their real boundaries. Marx says also that these revolutionaries, in their Roman costume and with Roman catch phrases on their lips, fulfilled the task of their age, and that their illusions served to exalt the given task in the human imagination, not to shrink from its solution. On the other hand, Engels argues that the victory of bourgeois revolution was only possible on the condition that it went beyond its actual objectives. In other words, even if in all these cases we are dealing with "illusory forms" what matters is not the establishment of this "illusoriness" (which, incidentally, is often evident both to opponents and neutral observers) but the ascertainment of how actual social conflicts are tackled with their help. It is therefore possible to conclude that "analysis mystical consciousness obscure to itself" is something other than scientific assessment of the truth or falsehood of theoretical opinions.

The history of ideas and human illusions cannot be anything but the history of men trying to understand their life and time

My remarks so far have been mostly designed to refute some of the conflicting views – hence their negative character.The next step is to present the essential features of the Marxian concept of "false consciousness." Analysis of the pertiment passages from the works of Marx and Engels suggests that what they considered the distinctive characteristic of this consciousness was its tendency to render itself i n d e p e n d e n t – a formula recurring with particular frequency in the *German Ideology* – from "real life" and human practice. The ghost of "false consciousness" appears whenever the thinker's attention is concentrated, not on man's activity in history, but on general notions, divorced from this activity, such as God, Reason, State, History, Natural Law, Society, Virtue, Man as Such, etc. Whenever Marx and Engels set about analyzing "false consciousness," such hypostases are inevitably present. They criticize those theories which in their view of the world leave no room for "men of flesh and blood." They also think that "false consciousness" tends to absolutize individual

points of view, to present its own values as having universal validity and to ignore the fact that it is historically limited. Disregard of the concrete, historical man is accompanied by overlooking the concrete, historical character of ideology. In other words, "false consciousness" is a consciousness alienated from history, and aspiring to the rank of some political, moral or scientific Absolute. What the founders of dialectical materialism wanted to achieve was not to discover an absolutely "true" consciousness, but to bring down all "ideological forms" to the solid ground of human history. "True" or "false," they are its integral part. "Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life process." Hence the many varieties of "ideology" are contrasted with the following programme: "/.../ we do not set out from what men say, imagine, or conceive, nor from what has been said, thought, imagined, or conceived of men, in order to arrive at men in the flesh. We begin with real, active men, and from their real life-process show the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life-process." As a result of this reversal of the point of view, consciousness is no longer independent: it ceases to have a history of its own, and becomes part and parcel of human history. It is "real, living individuals" that become the centre of interest, and consciousness is considered "only as their consciousness." This, of course, is a refutation of a theoretical "error" – but the assertion that being determines consciousness, and not vice versa, was in itself nothing more than a repetition of a familiar idea. When, for example, the Age of Reason critics of religion insisted that its sources were to be sought in the conditions of human existence or in certain group interests, they were in fact making the same discovery. On the other hand, the proposition that, while "ideology" was an escape from reality, no such escape was possible, was indeed something new. "False consciousness" is also someone's consciousness, and so is not just rubbish, but a specific response to a situation in life. In Engels' words: "Our ideologist may turn and twist as he likes, but the historical reality which he cast out at the door comes in again at the window, and while he may think he is framing a doctrine of morals and law for all times and for all worlds, he is in fact only making an image of the conservative or revolutionary tendencies of his time – an image which is distorted because it has been torn from its real basis and, like a reflection in a concave mirror, is standing on its head."

The Realm of Reason becomes reality in the form of bourgeois rule, Roman virtue proves the battle-cry of the French middle class, theological controversies terminate in political strife. Sooner of later the discrepancy is revealed between what men think of the objects of their activity and where this activity has actually led them. The result does not correspond to the intention, but is nevertheless absolutely real. Endowed with "false consciousness," people still create real history and tackle real social problems. It is on these grounds that one can speak (as Marx does in the letter to Ruge) of explaining "its own activity" to the world. And it is also possible to feel that "if the philosophers translated their language into the common speech from which it had been abstracted, they would realize that it was the distorted language of the real world." It is these principles that shaped the specific style of the critique of all ideologies, so typical of Marx and Engels, for which Marxists today often substitute the opposition between "truth" and "falsehood," "doctrine" and "doctrinairism." Of no mean importance for this style of criticism was the fact that it never presupposed deliberate falsification.

"Morality, religion, metaphysics and other ideologies, and their corresponding forms of consciousness, no longer retain therefore their appearance of autonomous existence. They have no history, no development; it is men, who in developing their material production and their material intercourse, change, along with this their real existence, their thinking and the products of their thinking." There is but one history and it is the history of man striving to attain his goals. Thus the student of ideology is faced with the necessity of "reducing" diverse aspects of social consciousness to the more "elementary" historical phenomena – in this case, acting men with their needs and interests. An excellent example of this "reduction" is the Marxian analysis of the 1848 revolution, which confirms the principle that "/.../ all the struggles within the State /.../ are merely the illusory forms in which the real struggles of the different classes with each other are fought out." In his *Preface to The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, Engels took a more general view of the matter: "... all historical struggles, whether they proceed in the political, religious, philosophical or some other ideological domain are in fact only the more or less clear expression of struggles of social classes." Instances of this hypothesis abound in the writings of Marx and Engels; among them are analyses of religious reform, utopian socialism, jacobinism, German philosophy, etc. Their excellence tends to obscure some of the essential dangers and difficulties which came to light in the later development of Marxist thought. The most important of these hazards is that the transition from "illusory" to "real forms" can easily itself become an illusion, by being simply a great mental jump. We assume, hypothetically, that every "idea" has its corresponding "interest," but the object, after all, is not to find for every "idea" a perfectly matching class interest. Nor is it our task to prove that ideologies are only a play of appearances since it is a well-known fact that they exert a great influence on the course of events. We may even find that two different ideologies reflect the same interests, but what is the value of this discovery if, in the given conditions, one of them proves esoteric and transient, while the other asserts itself as a "material force?" Neither must we insist on reducing the great diversity of ideological phenomena to a few basic relations between antagonistic classes: this as a rule puts us between the Scylla of sociological schematism and the Charybdis of sterile historicism which views every occurrence as unique, unrepeatable and irreducible. The history of research into ideologies supplies more than one reason for scepticism as to the possibility of avoiding these two dangers – it reveals only too many instances of an automatic registering of ideas or of "discoveries" of the order that "Shakespeare

Our gradually emerging knowledge of social reality must be distinguished from that of the historical consciousness of individuals and their groups

was a mammal." The Marxist analyses to which I have referred have, unfortunately, a limited significance: they, the mostly fragmentary, fail to provide any complete model of the functioning of the ideological superstructure, and in most cases are concerned with the "political illusion" which according to Marx and Engliels, is "moderately close to reality." In spite of this, many of their disciples treated the general reductionist hypothesis as a thesis which must at all times and places have the same degree of validity. As a result, there began in all fields a busy search for "latent" class interests – instead of specific studies designed to reveal the relationship between the various "ideological forms" and historical reality. Does Marxist historiography really have to carry out this kind of reduction in every case? A more feasible and reasonable procedure would be to try to get rid of the "independence" of ideology in a narrower sphere: to demonstrate the common ground between philosophy and literature, morality and politics, historiosophy and art. What I am suggesting is, briefly, an interpretation of Marx in a spirit of moderate "reductionism." In other words, the hypothesis that a case of "false consciousness" is involved should not necessarily entail the belief that some hidden class interests must be hunted down.

The Marxist analyses of "false consciousness" are concerned with three types of "illusions." One of these is what can be described as the "false consciousness" of the age. This was what Marx and Engels had in mind when, discussing the ideas of 1789, they echoed Fourier in speaking of the "tone" of each historical age. The word "age" is used quite freely here, but this need not be a stumbling-block; it is simply a question of ascertaining the thinkers' ideology, not from the point of view of who they are and what their class background is, but in the light of where and when they live. Thus, towards the close of Europe's Middle Ages, "every struggle against feudalism had to be led in religious disguise;" attempts at a speculative solution of social problems are typical of periods of "immature class relations;" and the Enlightenment idea of a "natural" independence of individuals is a characteristic "illusion" of "every new age." The humanistic phraseology of the French Revolution is the outcome of a situation in which "the class which makes a revolution appears from the beginning not as a class, but as the representation of the whole of society, simply because it is opposed to a class." (I am deliberately overlooking the difficulties in a precise definition of "class interests" – since even without them the "reduction" would be hardly easier.) In the capitalist world, governed as it is by the law of coincidence, the situation of man is closely linked to a specific "illusion" of freedom. Far from trying to exhaust this register, I am merely concerned with examples of a situation in which "false consciousness" is ascribed to men of a certain era (the close of the Middle Ages, periods without severe class conflicts, any new age, etc.), not to members of a certain class or social group. The peculiarity of their thinking and its "necessity," are here accounted for by the historical circumstances. Its change makes it possible to perceive – from a more or less distant time perspective – the hiatus between "idea" and "interest." Each age exposes as a "false consciousness" that of its antecedent revealing the actual consequences of its actions, and demonstrating by its very existence the transitory character of what was once thought to be "natural" and eternal. This does not mean, of course, that this kind of "illusion" involves no essential difficulties for the investigator. These appear both when we want to grasp the "tone" of an age and – particularly – when we endeavour to lay bare its origin. There is no doubt that in such cases we rely too much on intuition; and we tend to base our vision of the age on the knowledge of its leading thinkers, instead of trying more representative material. But this is not the right place to discuss these questions.

Next comes the "false consciousness" of a class. Marx and Engels tend to ascribe to people certain ways of thiking related to their class background. Thus, for example, the *petty bourgeois* will be always inclined to "imagine himself elevated above class antagonism generally," while the *bourgeois* tends to consider capitalist relations as everlasting, and to regard himself as man *tout court.* More quotations could be adduced, but this is hardly necessary since the situation is clearly delineated: certain types of "illusions" correspond with a given position within the class structure of society. Naturally, what is involved are not classes in general, as in the above examples, but classes in particular societies; the French *bourgeois* is not identical with the German *bourgeois* – to whom, incidentally, Marx and Engels devoted particular attention. But one point is always valid: "Upon the different forms of property, upon the social conditions of existence rises an entire superstructure of distinct and characteristically formed sentiments, illusions, modes of thoughts and views of life. The entire class creates and forms them... The single individual who derives them through tradition and education may imagine that they form the real motives and the starting point of his activity." This kind of "false consciousness" manifests its "illusory" character in confrontation with the consciousness of people belonging to other classes, which – though probably also "illusory" – as a rule constitutes an adequate frame of reference within which to pin down the reflection of the "conscious existence" of a social class in other people's views. An instructive example is the aristocratic criticism of the bourogeoisie in the revolutionary era. A peculiar difficulty in dealing with this kind of "illusion" arises from the lack of sufficiently precise instruments for analysing class consciousness, which makes research tend to centre round the views of professional ideologists – although proof should be first provided that this is a fully legitimate procedure. An extremely important task in this context is the undertaking of studies of common consciousness – as, for example, was emphasized by Gramsci.

Finally, there is the "false consciousness" of the ideologists – which was discussed in the greatest detail by Marx and Engels. This is certainy one of the forms of group consciousness which come into being in societies with an advanced division of labour. Marx and Engels were also interested in the specifically bureaucratic type of thinking of members of the administrative apparatus with its characteristic estrangement from society. Other similar statements deal with the "illusions" of the military – but the problem of "ideologists" still occupies a central place in Marxian writings. The very appearance of this specialized group in various societies has a decisive importance in making consciousness independent of practice. With the separation of manual from non-manual labour begins the era of "false consciousness": "From this moment consciousness really can imagine that it is something other than the consciousness of existing practice... From this moment consciousness can emancipate itself from the world and proceed to create pure theory, theology, philosophy, morality, etc."

The longer the tradition of each of these domains the more intense the sense of this autonomy can be. The "ideologist" is above all concerned with assessing the views of his predecessors; he does not try to find out whose "conscious existence" they are and what is the relationship between his sphere of interest and social practice. Every development in the history of ideas is for him no more than solely part of this history – and at that one that is exclusively philosophical, religious or legal. The history of ideas is now divorced from the history of men and becomes, moreover, split into independent fields according to the currently valid division of intellectual activities. The connelction between theory and "interests" becomes more and more obscure and complicated.

According to Marx and Engels, this situation involves two kinds of problems. First, there is the question of the relationship between ideologists and social classes. The connection, they point out, is real and inevitable, but there is also the possibility of "a certain opposition or even hostility," the nature of these relations depending on the whole of the social situation (thus, for example, sharp class antagonisms seem to strengthen the bonds between the ideologist and his class). Be it added in passing that the term "ideologist" is far from unambiguous and any investigation of these relationships should be preceded by an attempt to define it with greater accuracy. The second question concerns the interaction of the various "ideological forms." If one assumes that consciousness is always someone's "conscious existence," and if one questions the autonomy of its various domains, then the conclusion seems justified that they are in a way "equivalent" and mutually "translatable." Heine saw some features in common in Kant's critical philosophy and the political doctrine of Robespierre. Marx and Engels make similar observations: they insist, for example, that the Germans experience in their minds what other nations, particularly the French, experience in reality. Thus, they compare the French idea of equality with the German idea of self-knowledge and conclude that these are two different ways of expressing the same thing. Similarly – in the case of two ages instead of two nations – the religious thinking of the Reformation can be interpreted as a kind of counterpart of the political doctrine of the French Revolution. Examination of both sets of problems seems essential if we want to eliminate the "autonomy" of consciousness, not only in the realm of general theory, but also in the actual history of social ideas. Before these quetions are answered, the problem of the "false consciousness" of ideologists will time and again be made to float in a vacuum.

This classification of "illusions" is, of course, highly simplified and far from exhaustive. But it seems useful – not only as a means of systematizing what Marx and Englels had to say on "false consciousness;" it also brings home to us the essential gaps in the current Marxist theory of "ideological forms." In addition to the issues to which I have already referred, there is one more which deserves some attention. This is the problem of tradition which I consider absolutely crucial to the Marxist interpretation of "false consciousness." When Marx and Engels spoke of the "illusions" of the age, it was often its traditional ways of thinking that they had in mind (as in the case of the religious "forms" of social struggle). In discussing the "illusions" of a class, they were thinking of an inherited fund of ideas and sentiments, and speaking of the ideologists "illusions," they were stressing the basic importance of the "material which has formed itself independently from the thought of previous generations, and has gone through an independent series of developments in the brains of these succeeding generations." The role of tradition in ideologies of great social upheavals is brillinatly analyzed in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*. Paradoxically, however, this problem has not been systematically investigated by Marxist scholars – and one of the few modern theories of tradition has been put forward by an avowed anti-historicist, Karl R. Popper. But without such a theory there can be no satisfactory theory of "false consciousness." For if such consciousness is due to the impossibility of ascertaining our place in the historical process, then one of the reasons for this inability is that we can no longer clearly see the boundary between what we create ourselves and what we have unthinkingly taken over from our predecessors. An interesting – and slightly different – point about "false consciousness" is that the inherited "ideological forms" can serve a whole range of successive "interests," and still another aspect comes to light in those, fairly frequent, situations where modern controversies take the form of an argument about acceptance or rejection of tradition or the selection of one particular tradition rather than another. Until the question of tradition is settled, any "reduction" is bound to be an artificial and superficial operation. What deserves special attention is the problem of national tradition which can give rise to a peculiar type of group "illusion," which was not investigated by Marx and Engels but is now making itself felt more than ever before. The problem deserves a more detailed analysis; here I can only point to its existence.

To sum up, I feel that the Marxian concept of "false consciousness" is worth further reflexion and development. Its most attractive prospect lies in treatment of the history of thought as the history of men – not so much in the reduction of one to the other as in interpretation of both as aspects of one whole. This, I imagine, is a kind of scientific utopia – just as the vision of man creating his world with full consciousness is social utopia. But it is a utopia which is scientifically stimulating – its fruitfulness depending, however, on whether we can convert the history of thought into a social science, instead of imitating the naive rationalists who were only concerned with liberating mankind from "prejudice," although this "prejudice" was the only kind of history it had known. I am by no means inclined to consider the questions of truth and falsehood as sterile; but I think that the problem of our gradually emergent knowledge of social reality must be distinguished from that of the historical self-knowledge of human individuals and groups; the two, unfortunately, are not and cannot be identical.

The Gospel According to an Executioner is the name of a novel written by the well-known thriller writers, the Vayner brothers, which is going to be published after much delay.

Arkady Vayner was born in 1931 in Maryina Roshcha, a district rumoured to be the heart of Moscow's criminal world. Having finished school, Arkady chose one of the two opportunities which would allow him not to say goodbye to the underworld and joined a college of law. After graduation he started working as an investigator for the Moscow Criminal Investigation Department (CID).

"I have always willingly shared my experiences as investigator," Arkady Vayner says. "Once Norman Borodin, a journalist, a writer, and a Soviet spy, demanded that my brother and I write a story for him."

The abundance of material prevented the Vayner Brothers from writing a short story. Instead, the result was the brothers' first novel, *A Watch for Mr. Kelly*.

Shortly after that Arkady Vayner resigned from the CID and turned to writing. Together with his brother he wrote over 20 books which were translated in about forty countries.

"All this work, though, was only an approach to the main endeavour of our life: the two novels written in 1975–1979 named *A Noose and a Stone in Green Grass* and *The Gospel According to an Executioner*. These are no whodunits, but books about victims and executioners. The first novel tells about the murder of the great actor Mikhoels and has already been published in the Soviet Union, the United States, Switzerland, Italy, Germany... Moscow's Mossovet Theatre is going to put on a production of the novel and a Hollywood film studio is contemplating a screen version.

"The second novel, *The Gospel According to an Executioner*, is a narration of a KGB officer who was behind the Doctors' Conspiracy, the case which started a massive anti-Semitic campaign in the Soviet Union shortly before Stalin's death."

* * *

The music by the Leningrad composer **Leonid Desyatnikov,** 35, to Alexander Mitta's film *Lost in Siberia* came as a pleasant surprise to the viewers at the Cannes Festival.

Lost in Siberia is Alexander's second experience in cinema. He debuted a year ago in the A.Zeldovich's film *The Sunset* which was shown at the Berlin Film Festival. After the festival the film was bought in Britain, and Alexander signed a contract for the production of a compact disc of *The Sunset* soundtrack. Big British cinema firms have shown interest in the Leningrad composer's music.

Desyatnikov joined the Union of Soviet composers during his army service. He created his first work, the opera *Poor Lisa*, when he was 25. Then came the cantatas *The Gift* and *The Bouquet*. In the middle of the 1980's he composed the opera *Bravo, Bravissimo, Pioneer Anisimov!* and the cantata *The Pinezh Tale about Pushkin's Duel and Death*. Desyatnikov boldly mixes the musical styles of various epochs and thus his works sound quite absurd to some listeners, in spite of the music's exquisite sophistication. Accused of tilting to the absurdist trend in art, Desyatnikov decided to study the trend thoroughly – and became absorbed in the poems of Kharms and Oleynik. As a result he created a musical series called *The Poet's Life and Love*.

The composer promises that music-lovers will soon have a chance to enjoy his latest creation – the opera *Sacred Winter*, based on the texts of songs of American pioneers published by a soviet publishing house in 1949. At the same time Desyatnikov is composing a cello sonata. His first disc will soon be available.

D.Kadantsev

The guardian angel of journalists

Head of the US Bureau of *The Guardian*, **Martin Walker,** has been sent to Moscow by the International Committee for Protection of Journalists.

"Three months ago, after the events in Riga and Vilnius, after the closure of the popular TV nightshow *Vzglyad* and the dismissal of hosts of the *Late Night News*, we started fearing that the days of glasnost were counted in the USSR," said Walker.

Martin Walker worked in Moscow for four years (1984-1988) as the Moscow correspondent of *The Guardian* and he is an expert in the affairs of the Soviet press. He wrote the first book about the changes in the Soviet Union, entitled *The Awakening Giant: Gorbachev's Russia*. The book has already been translated into eleven languages.

The Committee for Protection of Journalists was set up ten years ago when several journalists met with trouble in Latin America. Now the Committee carries out three annual surveys in the countries where journalists are in an especially difficult situation. This year the countries which come under the Committee's scrutiny are Zaire, Saudi Arabia and the Soviet Union. A special attention is attached to the mass media in Latvia and Lithuania.

After he polled some Soviet colleagues, Martin Walker decided that the devil was not as black as it was painted. According to Walker, the situation with the media is quite tolerable in the USSR: there are no censors, but some economic problems have been coming up of late. As for the Soviet television, it is harmed by years of monopoly of the state on all TV broadcasts. Changes have been taking place in this sphere too: the Russian TV has been set up and a Free TV Station of the Union of Soviet Journalists may start working soon. In his report which is due in September this year Martin Walker will describe the condition of his Soviet colleagues in greater detail. Since the Committee works on the same principle as Amnesty International – soliciting public support for journalists, the report will be sent to many international organizations, including the United Nations. After this the world public will pass its judgement on the situation with journalists' rights in the USSR, sending letters to those who violate these rights. We have already lived through one such instance: President Gorbachev received a lot of letters in support of the editor of the popular weekly *Argumenty i Fakty*, edited by Starkov.

I.Lagunina

The Taiwanese **Huang Hua,** 52, who has already served 21 years in prison, has been convicted for the fourth time. This time the supreme court of Taiwan sentenced him to ten years in prison for instigating anti-government demonstrations.

In 1988 Huang Hua organized Movement for a New Nation which held meetings across the island demanding that Taiwan's population be regarded as Taiwanese, not Chinese. Huang Hua, who advocates direct presidential elections, nominated himself for president in 1990 from the opposition Democratic Progress Party, although he had no right to occupy a state office as the court had stripped him of his civil rights. Although Huang Hua has never called for a forceful altering of the Taiwanese regime, the court ruled that his actions exceeded the limits of freedom of speech. The reason for the court ruling was not Huang Hua's opposition to indirect presidential elections or his unlawful nomination for presidency. Huang Hua is a furious opponent of Taiwan's unification with mainland China and demands that a Republic of Taiwan be proclaimed. The law on national security and the code of punishment for anti-government activities and the propaganda of such views is prohibited in Taiwan and is severely punished.

* * *

In the opinion of the Hamburg-based weekly *Stern,* **Leni Riefenstahl,** 88, a former actress, film director, and, as rumour has it, an intimate friend of Hitler's, is the world's master of underwater picture taking. Her personal archive contains a unique collection of photographs of coral reefs.

Leni debuted as an actress at 23 and seven years later she created her first film, the romantic legend *Blue Light,* acting as script-writer, director, and actress. After

Hitler came to power, she started propagating the Nazi ideology and the "new order" and soon became one of the leading film directors of the Third Reich. Some of her films were shot on the orders of Goebbels' ministry of propaganda: *The Triumph of Faith, The Imperial Party Congress, Our Wehrmacht,* etc. *The Triumph of Willpower* (1935) was a glorification of Adolf Hitler. Leni has the warmest memories about Fuhrer: "I still remember each word of our conversations," says she.

However, Leni Riefenstahl derives no pleasure from discussing history and politics. "Everything that I have ever said has come back to me in a distorted form," she complains. Seven years ago Leni Riefenstahl had to face trial on charges of forcing gypsies to act in a crowd scene in her 1940 film. After the shooting was over the gypsies were sent to Auschwitz and exterminated. However, the Riefenstahl trial ended with no result. Since then Frau Riefenstahl has been specializing in underwater photography.

* * *

Bunin's many faces

He was twice expelled from the Moscow Surikov Academy of Fine Arts for professional inadequacy. Bunin always excelled in history, but his marks in drawing were miserable. The Union of Soviet Artists corrected the teachers' mistake in 1955 when it admitted the college dropout **Pavel Bunin** as full-fledged member. Several years later Bunin was admitted to the Dante Section of the USSR Academy of Sciences for his series of pictures and articles devoted to Dante and his Human Comedy.

Once Bunin came across a Kornei Chukovsky book about Oscar Wild. Bunin drew several pictures and showed them to Chukovsky. This was the beginning of a lasting friendship. The celebrated author and the young artist were united by a common love for English history and literature. A man of extraordinary memory, Bunin can cite lengthy pieces from the works of Gibbon, Mackoley, Churchill, and Carlyle. And when it comes to Dickens and Scott, one can not help thinking about a one-actor theatre.

However, Bunin's greatest passion is classic poetry. Sir Peter Norman, Professor of Slavonic Studies at the London University, says Bunin's illustrations to Dante, Pushkin, Shakespeare allow the readers to see the progress of history, the magnitude of the heroes through the mists of time.

Bunin has travelled widely. He was especially facinated by London, Athens, and Vienna. To get an Austrian residence permit, Bunin had to demonstrate his talents right in the office of a high-ranking Vienna bureaucrat: "They named various Austrian Keizers to me, and I depicted them by memory right away." The residence permit was issued with no delay.

Bunin's exhibitions have been arranged in Paris, Cambridge, Vienna, Bazel, West Berlin, and a number of other West European cities. Each exhibition presented the artist with new friends and admirers. However, nostalgia was stronger. When he returned home, Bunin continued to translate British classic poetry from Raleigh, Queen Elizabeth's favourite, to the Nobel laureate Kipling.

A volume of Omar Khayyam is being published with Bunin's illustrations.

"I am glad that the Orbita Publishers are producing the book with my drawings," says Bunin, "I think the book will sell well. However, I am afraid that my friends from Orbita rarely read the Sermon on the Mount in which Jesus Christ said: "...Let your communication be "Yea, yea", "Nay, nay": for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil!"

"Orbita has been keeping my translations of the British classics and illustrations of them for over a year already. But when it was time to start publishing them, the Orbita people said there was no paper." ■

Spaso House: its hosts and its guests

The US Embassy's secret life which "all Moscow" shared

Jack Matlock with friends: Bella Akhmadulina and Andrei Voznesensky

Photo: Rebecca Matlock

The mansion built in 1914 for the Siberian merchant Mikhail Vtorov at that time attracted "all Moscow" with its exquisite architecture and the lavish parties its rich owner arranged. In 1933, when diplomatic relations were established between the USSR and the USA, the mansion became the residence of the American Ambassador. Vtorov gradually sank into oblivion, and the mansion became known as Spaso House – the American name for it.

Those who took up residence there were, of course, specially trained men capable of assuming enormous responsibility for the dialogue between the two superpowers. Sometimes the Ambassadors succeeded one another rather frequently (President Roosevelt had five of them, for instance), leaving no deep trace in the diplomatic relations between the two countries. But some of the US Ambassadors kept the post for a long time gaining the reputation of being indispensable-whatever the changes in the political atmosphere.

Amabassador Arthur Hartman worked here in the years of the Brezhnev stagnation, the Andropov reanimation experiment, the Chernenko degradation, and the last two years of his stay coincided with the Gorbachev perestroika. After Hartman's departure, an article by him on the situation in, and outlook for, our country was transmitted by Voice of America. Since then it has been my conviction that the Spaso House residents are superbly-informed professionals; I wish our own political Establishment could compare with them in competence and analytical skill.

In Moscow, Hartman was known not only on the diplomatic scene, but on the musical scene as well. In the Conservatoire, one couldn't possibly fail to notice Arthur who combined aristocratic elegance with the virile good looks which go with our idea of a Hollywood superman. He was overshadowed, however, by his wife Donna, a dazzling beauty. Her appearance overwhelmed not only those who saw her for the first time. After a concert in the Pushkin Museum, Mati Palm, a far from sentimental Nordically restrained Estonia opera bass, complained to me that he had had a very hard time singing with her eyes on him. At that concert I, too, forgot all about politics – although American troops had landed in Haiti on that day, I gave a bouquet to Donna. Later I was told that giving flowers to the American Ambassador's wife on such a day was a political action, and that I, a lecturer on ideology, had better think about that.

Donna was a benevolent genius for many musicians. At that time, dissident musicians were barred not only from foreign tours, but also from performing in Moscow's small-time places of entertainment. The Spaso House offered them their only chance to play in front of appreciative audiences. It is an open secret that Donna helped them make ends meet off stage as well.

Nevertheless, the Hartmans, through no fault of their own, failed to dispel the atmosphere of fear and suspicion with regard to the Spaso House which had built up in our society for decades. A breakthrough occured in 1987 when Jack Matlock succeeded Hartman as the US Ambassador here. People from all walks of life started pouring into the mansion which had gotten a new lease on life. The militiaman at the front door would give their papers a perfunctory inspection and wave them in. Tighter security was imposed only during the Gulf crisis: the Soviet law-enforcement agencies feared terrorist attempts on American diplomats' lives.

The American side also revised its notions of security. One day Rebecca Matlock asked me to accompany her to her photographic exhibition. I thought she would use one of the embassy cars. As it turned out, she had expected us to give her a lift to the the exhibition hall, and was quite disappointed about having to bother her husband with a request to lend her a car. On another occasion we sent to the conservatoire on the eve of the opening of the Soviet-American festival Making Music Together. A huge pro-Yeltsin demonstration swept Moscow's streets that day. The security service warned Rebecca against riding in an embassy limousine, so we used the Grand Hall director's Zhiguli instead.

The Matlocks' preferences could be judged by the sort of people they entertained at Spaso House. Their most welcome and privileged guests were Andrei Voznesensky and his wife Zoya Boguslavskaya. Poetry recitals (Jack goes in for poetry) and art shows (Rebecca is a first-rate photographer) were often arranged. Rebecca's favourite photrographic sub-

jects are architecture and landscapes. Her portraits of politicians and men of culture, however, were the greatest success. Many of them sat for their portraits right there at the Spaso House: Rostropovich, Menuhin, Shchedrin, Cliburn, Caldwell, Aksyonov, Korotich, Soloukhin – and, of course, the much-loved Voznesensky whose photographs greatly outnumber others'. Rebecca is extremely self-exacting with regard to everything connected with her cultural activities. Once she refused to show her exhibition in the Conservatoire two hours before the opening of the Soviet-American festival: the order in which the photographs were arranged did not suit her; politics should not take precedence over scenic landscapes, she said.

Once upon a time, an American Embassy official with a camera slung over his neck was automatically suspect under the laws of socialist vigilance. Rebecca has helped smash this old stereotype which was part of our system of ideological conditioning.

Jack Matlock has also made a substantial contribution to Moscow's cultural life. One night he even ascended the stage of the Grand Hall of the Conservatoire to recite the text of Copland's symphonic poem *The Lincoln Portrait* in Voznesensky's translation. "I do not want to be either a slave, or a slave-owner," he quoted the Great American's words... Mr. Matlock's performance was a resounding success, and Vsevolod Panchenko, Director of the Moskontsert commercial entertainment agency immediately offered him a contract.

The Ambassador and his wife were showered with projects and ideas – many well-wishers insisted that their opinions were of special importance to American foreign policy-making. Jack heard out their suggestions patiently and benevolently, while a more expansive Rebecca could tell the importunate guest that he was taking too much of their time. Once she plainly told the owner of a Paris museum whose terms she found unacceptable that showing her pictures in Paris wasn't such a great privilege, after all.

Incidentally, the Embassy has been receiving letters in great numbers of late. Rebecca said once that after each reception secretaries pick up heaps of letters. Nevertheless, each of the letters gets read. I also wrote to the Matlocks once, setting forth my suggestions as to what the *America* magazine should be like in the glasnost era. The reply I received was strikingly thorough.

It is not parties and the hosts' personalities that set the tenor of life at the Spaso House, of course. Big politics is made there, and ways to help the formerly No. 1 political opponent are being considered. This is by no means done out of altruistic motives. Whereas Iran, Iraq, and other disturbers of the peace have given the world so many problems, what kind of trouble can be expected from the missile-larded colossus sliding into chaos?

The Americans make no secret today of the results of their reflections and their analysis of the situation in the USSR. In particular, ideas and information are exchanged in the form of Spaso House teach-ins, suggested by Mr. Matlock, which are forums of Soviet and American experts in various spheres of knowledge. Such as analysis prevents the US from rushing into conclusions and from overreacting to what is happening in the USSR.

I remember the row caused by Viktors Alksnis' statement at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, which was given extensive press coverage. The Colonel said then that, according to his sources of information, the CIA supported separatists, encouraged them to break up the Union, while the leaders of our country just couldn't make up their minds to do anything about that. Previously, the US would have reacted to such attacks by State Department protests, counter-accusations, and demonstrations of hurt pride. This time, it did nothing of the sort. Jack Matlock, whom I ran into at the Conservatoire, said, coolly: "I've had a talk with Kryuchkov, he doesn't think so." Kryuchkov's latest speech in Parliament has, alas, proved to be to the contrary.

Ours are amazing times: until quite recently the Americans who worked in Moscow preferred to meet Soviet people of their own choice, knowing that those who sought to strike up an acquaintance with them were either black marketeers or persons authorized to make such contacts. Today the stream of cards and invitations pouring into the Spaso House shows no signs of running dry. The Americans have become much more careful, however – our "emancipated" citizens may get them into a mess that would have been the envy of Beria's NKVD...

Recently, Robert Straus, 72, nicknamed "Mr. Democrat" has been appointed a new American Ambassador to the USSR. More often, he is referred to as "Mr. Capitalist". It looks as if the US President has decided to experiment in our country – which, in his words, "is undergoing fantastic changes" – with a fantastic kaleidoscope of diplomatic styles. The new Ambassador is not going to "begin from scratch" – the successful styles of his two predecessors have given him a good head start.

Leonid Goldin

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The embassy is holding an investigation

Persecution of Vietnamese students in Moscow

These days, the Vietnamese students association of Moscow State University is witnessing grim, painful meetings featuring self-criticism; a kind of investigation is under way... All these measures have been provoked by the "notice board of the vietnamese students association" and the samizdat magazine *Yunost* (The Young Generation).

If you turn right from the premises of the Moscow State University club and go to sector B, you will see a stand with the inscription "Vietnam." This is the "notice board of the Vietnamese students association," intended for the exchange of different information, from congratulations and notices about a soccer match or a walking trip to official communications about the Embassy's decisions on this or that matter and the resolutions of the CPV and the Vietnamese government.

The ball was set rolling by the letter by the Vietnamese writer Duong Thu Huong published in the magazine *New Times* (No. 13, 1991) under the title *Confession of a Vietnamese Dissident*. Evidently, the letter reflected the mood of the majority of our fellow Vietnamese studying in Moscow, — and someone pasted it on the stand. Soon the text was removed from the stand, but after a while it reappeared. A few days later on the stand was displayed an article by the South Vietnamese writer Vu Hanh which had been published in *Moscow News*. Then leaflets appeared calling on the Vietnamese authorities to change their attitude towards discussions and freedom of speech.

But each time all articles and leaflets were removed by the Party and administration officials of the Vietnamese mission in Moscow. They have taken to visiting Moscow State University. They summoned the Vietnamese students to meetings and interlocutions, and threatened them with all kinds of punishments.

It seems strange, but the appearance on the stand of an article cut from a Soviet publication that anyone can freely buy and read is viewed by Vietnamese diplomats as an attempt to inform foreigners about the internal situation in Vietnam! But truth and fairness — no matter whether they are conveyed in Vietnamese or Russian — always remain truth and fairness. *Confession of a Vietnamese Dissident* had been read by many thousands of people before it was hung up on the stand. So, what are the authorities afraid of?

They recommend that the students and post-graduate students confine themselves to their studies and not do "bad" things. The chief of the Embassy's department for work with students and post-graduate students has issued an oral order forbiding us to use the stand for "bad" purposes. From now on, only Party and administration officials have the right to post material on the stand.

By order of the first deputy minister of education of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the post-graduate students Ho Hanh and Viet Ha have been sent down from the Moscow State University post-graduate course for their involvement in the "stand case."

The views of young people were also expressed on the pages of the samizdat magazine *Yunost*. Members of the editorial board and the authors of "objectionable" articles have been summoned to the Embassy. They have been told to write explanatory letters and reports about their past activities." As a result *Yunost* has been banned, and they are doing everything possible to hamper the distribution of the first issue of the magazine. The members of the editorial board and the authors of "objectionable" articles face the threat of a severe punishment.

So, what materials published in the journal are regarded as "harmful"? The story *The Genius* as a good example. The hero complains that the fate of people like himself "depends on incompetent and conservative people in Hanoi." Or the reporting by Buu Long titled *Saigon — a meeting one year later*, which is about the enormous gulf between the luxurious life of those at the helm and the misery of common people in that city. The author also describes how "revolutionary officials" spend on their gatherings sums that are a hundred times the salary of a university professor. Considered to be especially dangerous is the treatise by Phuong Trinh, *Reflections about Socialism*, in which the author gives an analysis of historical conceptions, from Utopian Socialism to the ideas of "democratic socialism," and expresses regret that at present there are no conditions for the building of true socialism. Also seen as harmful is the article by Dui Tan *Let us join hands*.

Dui Tan calls on his fellow Vietnamese "to put the interests of the country above political views, striving for power, and personal interests" and "to unite for the sake of a bright future in the native Vietnamese land." Nor were the authorities satisfied with the article by titled "Some thoughts on the question of political pluralism."

The Vietnamese authorities in Moscow speak of a possible connection between the "guilty" students and the well-known dissident and the former deputy editor-in-chief of the newspaper *Nhan Dan* Bui Tin, and Duong Thu Huong. they suppose that some of the authors have received the materials from Russian democrats, if not from the West, and have already chosen for the unruly such hard and fast labels as "anti patriots" and "reactionaries."

In short, the Vietnamese students in Moscow State University are living through difficult times when people regard each other with suspicion. I call on all readers of *New Times:*

"Dear friends! Give your backing to those who have had their scientific careers wrecked because they have openly expressed their opinion and whose fate is now difficult to foretell."

I call on my countrymen not to look for the truth in the "sources" and resolutions! The truth is that our country is indisputably backward and our people are extremely poor. And don't hurry to blame students! Their actions have not been prompted by any "external reactionary forces."

Dân Den
MOSCOW

The young Vietnamese do not want such a future for themselves

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